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ABSTRACT
Water is an essential input for agricultural production. Agriculture, in turn, is globalized
through the trade of agricultural commodities. The relationship between international trade
and water resources is an issue of great interest in the literature. Many studies focus on
the relationship between trade and virtual water resources, without direct consideration of
domestic, physical water resources. Now, there is a critical need to better understand the
implications of trade for domestic (physical) water use. As such, the main goal of this
dissertation is to understand linkages between trade and water resource both theoretically
and empirically.
In this dissertation, I develop a theoretical model that emphasizes four tradeoffs involving
water-use decision-making that are important yet not always considered in a consistent
framework. One tradeoff focuses on competition for water among different economic sectors.
A second tradeoff examines the possibility that certain types of agricultural investments
can offset water use. A third tradeoff explores the possibility that the rest of the world
can be a source of supply or demand for a country’s water-using commodities. The fourth
tradeoff concerns how variability in water supplies influences farmer decision-making. I show
conditions under which trade liberalization affect water use. Two policy scenarios to reduce
water use are evaluated. First, I derive a target tax that reduces water use without offsetting
the gains from trade liberalization, although important tradeoffs exist between economic
performance and resource use. Second, I show how subsidization of water-saving technologies
can allow producers to use less water without reducing agricultural production, making such
subsidization an indirect means of influencing water use decision-making. Finally, I outline
conditions under which riskiness of water availability affects water use. These theoretical
model results generate hypotheses that can be tested empirically in future work.
I also contribute to the debate over globalization and the environment by asking: What is
the impact of trade on national water use and water quality? To address this question I em-
ploy econometric methods to quantify the causal relationship between trade openness, water
use and nutrient use. Specifically, I use the instrumental variables methodology to evaluate
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the impact of trade openness on domestic water withdrawals in agriculture and industry,
national nitrate, phosphate and potash use in agriculture. I find that a one percentage point
increase in trade openness leads to a 5.21% decrease in agricultural water withdrawals. I find
that trade openness reduces water use in agriculture primarily through the intensive margin
effect, by leading farmers to produce more with less water, such as through the adoption
of technology. I do not find evidence for extensive margin or crop mix impacts on agricul-
tural water withdrawals. Significantly, these results demonstrate that trade openness leads
to less water use in agriculture. However, for water quality side, I find that the impact of
trade openness on nutrient use, if any, is very small. This is in line with previous research
that shows that trade openness does not have a negative impact on the environment. Why
would trade openness reduce nutrient applications in agriculture much smaller than agricul-
tural water use? I show that the elasticity of substitution between nutrient use and capital
is smaller than is the elasticity of substitution between water and capital. This suggests
that agricultural inputs such as capital and labor are easier to substitute for water than
they are for nutrient use. This helps to explain why the impact of trade on nutrient use is
much smaller. This finding has broad scientific and policy relevance as I endeavor to untan-
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We live in an increasingly globalized world (Rosegrant et al., 2002; Hoekstra and Mekon-
nen, 2012), where trade in water-intensive commodities – such as agriculture – represents
an important interaction between people and water resources (Allan, 1993; Hoekstra and
Hung , 2005), since the vast majority of water resources goes towards agricultural produc-
tion (Gleick , 1993; Oki and Kanae, 2006; Wada et al., 2010; Vörösmarty et al., 2000). The
relationship between international trade and water resources is an issue of great interest in
the literature (Hoekstra, 2010; Lenzen et al., 2013). An extensive literature has developed
on the water resources embodied in traded goods (i.e. ‘virtual water trade’). Significant
quantities of water (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012), nutrients (MacDonald et al., 2012),
energy (Vora et al., 2017), and land (Kastner et al., 2014) are embodied in internationally
traded goods. However, many studies focus on the relationship between trade and virtual
water resources, without direct consideration of domestic, physical water resources. Quan-
tifying the resources embodied in traded goods does not help us to understand if more or
less resources would have been used in the absence of trade. As such, the main goal of this
dissertation is to understand linkages between trade and water resources.
The relationship between international trade and water resources – particularly implica-
tions of freshwater scarcity for trade patterns – is an important outstanding question in the
literature (Hoekstra, 2010; Lenzen et al., 2013). Thus far, the integration of theory with
empirical work in complex sociohydrologic systems is rare. This makes it difficult to identify
and test key hypotheses and guide policy (Wichelns , 2015). Integrating theoretical founda-
tions with the empirically-driven virtual water trade literature will enable future research
efforts to be guided by theoretical predictions. Research progress occurs when research ef-
forts coalesce around a common theoretical framework, identify its many implications, and
test the hypotheses generated with empirical data (Copeland and Taylor , 2003). As such,
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the goal is to identify the mechanistic relationship between water as a factor of production
and trade in water-intensive commodities, such as agriculture. By presenting theoretical
predictions across a variety of scenarios of interest, I hope to guide future empirical work in
this area.
Besides theoretical approach, it is also important to quantify the effect of trade on water
resource. The broad consensus of much of this work is that trade liberalization saves water
resources. However, much of the water resources community continues to publish work that
claims the opposite. For this reason, the goal is to establish the causal impact of trade on
water resources using empirical methods that are well established in economics. In this way,
one of the main aims is to introduce this methodology to the water resources community.
The instrumental variables methodology for causal inference has been recently introduced to
the water resources literature for the case of crop insurance (Deryugina and Konar , 2017a).
Another major motivation with this study is to contribute results to the growing debate in
the water resources community on the impact of trade for domestic water use.
There has been much interest in the implications of trade for water resource and the
environment. Here, we consider the case of nutrient fertilizers. Nutrient use is an important
channel through which agriculture leads to deteriorations in water quality (Liu et al., 2010;
Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2015, 2018). There is a critical need to better understand drivers of
nutrient use in the global agricultural system, including the role of trade in the nutrient use of
nations. Nations may change their agricultural production practices in order to participate in
the international trade system. As such, trade may impact the quantity of nutrient fertilizers
– a key agricultural input – used to grow our food. It’s essential to quantify this effect.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 International Trade Model
The theoretical model builds on a long history of trade theory in economics, first initiated
by Smith (1776). The standard two-sector, two-factor and two-country general equilibrium
model (2x2x2 model) is widely used in economics (Krugman et al., 2012). It is assumed that
producers maximize their profits – synonymous with cost minimization – since perfect market
integration exists in the model, which means that producers operate under the equilibrium
condition that marginal costs equal marginal profits. Here, ‘factor’ refers to a resource that is
used to produce a commodity. Typical trade models incorporate labor and capital as factors
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of production, while environmental variables have started being incorporated in recent years,
such as pollution (Copeland and Taylor , 2003).
Trade models rely on the notion that trade is driven by comparative advantage, a concept
first introduced by Ricardo (1817). A country has the comparative advantage in the pro-
duction of a good when its opportunity cost of producing that good – relative to all other
factors of production – is lower than in its trading partner (Krugman et al., 2012). This no-
tion gave rise to the Hecksher-Ohlin Theorem, related to trade and natural resources, which
states that a country that is abundant in a factor will export the good whose production
is intensive in that factor (Krugman et al., 2012). The specific factor model (Samuelson,
1971; Jones , 1971) highlights the fact that certain factors of production are less mobile than
others and can only be utilized by certain sectors of the economy, with implications for sub-
stitution between factors. The model that I present builds upon this long and rich tradition
in trade theory through the explicit incorporation of water resources. In fact, the need to
explicitly account for comparative advantage in virtual water trade research was recently
highlighted (Wichelns , 2015).
1.2.2 Instrumental Variable Method
The main goal of this dissertation is to understand the linkage between trade and water
resource. An ordinary least-square (OLS) regression approach is a simple way. However,
the OLS estimate might be biased primarily because of two reasons. First, reverse causality
may exist. Second, endogeneity distorts our interpretation of regression results. A common
cause of endogeneity is that a confounder variable is impacting both the independent and
dependent variables. A common approach to solve endogeneity is control variable approach
(CVA), which is to control the confounder variables. However, CVA will fail if there are
unobserved confounder variables such as policy.
To overcome potential endogeneity issues, I employ an instrumental variables (IV) ap-
proach. For IV approach, we collect other observable variables (i.e. instruments) which
is highly correlated with the endogenous variables (X) yet uncorrelated with dependent
variables (Y). Then we estimate the effect of X on Y through the instruments. In this
dissertation, I follow the approach employed in Frankel and Romer (1999). Frankel and
Romer (1999) introduced an instrumental variables approach to determine the impact of
trade openness, based on the gravity model of trade. The gravity model of international
trade is a widely-used empirical model to estimate the variation of bilateral trade. Frankel
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and Romer (1999) use the geographic attributes of countries to instrument for their bilat-
eral trade. With instruments constructed according to the gravity model, the instrumental
variable method is an effective method to overcome endogeneity issues. They conclude that
the constructed instrument covers more information about international trade beyond ge-
ographic factors, and therefore is a high-quality instrument for trade openness. Based on
this instrument, a series of paper in economics discuss the causal effect of trade openness
on economic growth, and try to check the robustness of this method (Irvin and Tervi , 2002;
Noguer and Siscart , 2005). Recently, this method is extended to the environmental field
to sort out the causality between international trade openness and environmental indices,
such as sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide emissions (Frankel and Rose, 2005; Managi et al.,
2009). Kagohashi et al. (2015) constructs a similar instrument and introduce this method to
socio-hydrology to estimate the causal relationship between trade openness and total water
withdrawals. Kagohashi et al. (2015) conclude that trade can save water through applying
water-saving technologies and reforming industry composition. Based on this rich literature,
I consider the unique characteristics of agriculture and focus on the causal impact of trade
to agricultural water withdrawals and nutrient use.
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions
The overall research question for this dissertation is how does trade impact domestic water
use? I present a general model to generate insights into the mechanisms, and also quantify
the effects of trade openness on water withdrawals and water quality empirically. To specify,
the three objectives of this dissertation is as the following.
Objective 1 Present a general model that is able to generate insights into the mechanistic
relationships between water resources and trade.
Research Question(s): (1) What is the mechanistic relationship between water re-
sources and trade? (2) What are the implications of trade liberalization for water
resource use? (3) What are the implications of a water tax for water resource use? (4)
What are the implications of a water subsidy for water resource use? (5) If producers
account for risk, how does water resource use change?
Objective 2 Quantify the causal effect of trade on domestic water use.
Research Question(s): (1) What is the impact of trade on national water use? (2)
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How is the impact different by sectors (i.e. agricultural and industrial water with-
drawals)? (3)Why does trade openness lead to less water withdrawals in agriculture?
Objective 3 Quantify the causal effect of trade on nutrient use to understand the effect of
trade on water quality.
Research Question(s): (1) What is the impact of trade on the nutrient use of
nations? (2) Why does trade openness impact nutrient use differently?
1.4 Research Contributions
The original contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
(a) This dissertation will help to present a consistent framework that captures the mech-
anistic relationships between water as a domestic factor of production, as well as the
consumption and trade of water-intensive commodities. This model will help us to un-
derstand the impact of trade and various policies on water use, agricultural production,
and economic welfare, which may be of interest to governments, planning authorities,
and non-governmental organizations dealing with scarce water resources.
(b) This dissertation will help to broaden socio-hydrology through the incorporation of eco-
nomics, and also present a theoretical foundation for the virtual water trade literature.
It contributes to further integration of hydro-economics, socio-hydrology, and virtual
water trade research.
(c) I contribute to the literature by explicitly considering the impact of trade for domestic,
physical water use. Importantly, I use the instrumental variables technique to evaluate
the causal impact of trade openness for domestic agricultural and industrial water
withdrawals, and nutrient use.
(d) I contribute to the debate over trade and environment by providing evidence that trade
openness does not have a significant negative effect on water withdrawals or water
quality. Importantly, I provide evidence that an open economy can benefit from trade
by saving agricultural water withdrawals through the intensive margin.
1.5 Dissertation Structure
The chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows:
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Chapter 2 I develop a theoretical model that emphasizes four tradeoffs involving water-use
decision-making that are important yet not always considered in a consistent frame-
work. I show conditions under which trade liberalization affect water use. Two policy
scenarios (i.e. water tax and subsidy) to reduce water use are evaluated. Finally, I
outline conditions under which riskiness of water availability affects water use.
Chapter 3 I quantify the causal relationship between trade openness and water use. Specif-
ically, I use the instrumental variables methodology to evaluate the impact of trade
openness on domestic water withdrawals in agriculture and industry. I also check the
channels through which trade will effect water withdrawals.
Chapter 4 I quantify the impact of trade on the nutrient use of nations. I address this
question by using econometric methods to quantify the causal relationship between
the trade openness and the nutrient use of nations. I find that trade openness does not
have a significant impact on nutrient use, which is different from the impact on water
withdrawals. I also explore the potential reason that causes this difference.
The core chapters of this dissertation either have or will be submitted for publication.
Below are the full references:
Chapter 2: Dang, Q., M. Konar, J.J. Reimer, G. Di Baldassarre, R. Zeng and X. Lin
(2016), A theoretical model of water and trade, Advances in Water Resources, Vol 89,
pp. 32-41, doi: 10.1016/j.advwatres.2015.12.016.
Chapter 3: Dang Q., and M. Konar (2018), Trade openness and domestic water use, Water
Resources Research, Vol 54, Issue 1, pp. 4-18, doi: 10.1002/2017WR021102, Vol 54,
doi: 10.1002/2017WR021102.




A THEORETICAL MODEL OF WATER AND TRADE
2.1 Abstract
Water is an essential input for agricultural production. Agriculture, in turn, is globalized
through the trade of agricultural commodities. In this paper, we develop a theoretical model
that emphasizes four tradeoffs involving water-use decision-making that are important yet
not always considered in a consistent framework. One tradeoff focuses on competition for
water among different economic sectors. A second tradeoff examines the possibility that
certain types of agricultural investments can offset water use. A third tradeoff explores the
possibility that the rest of the world can be a source of supply or demand for a country’s
water-using commodities. The fourth tradeoff concerns how variability in water supplies
influences farmer decision-making. We show conditions under which trade liberalization
affect water use. Two policy scenarios to reduce water use are evaluated. First, we derive
a target tax that reduces water use without offsetting the gains from trade liberalization,
although important tradeoffs exist between economic performance and resource use. Second,
we show how subsidization of water-saving technologies can allow producers to use less water
without reducing agricultural production, making such subsidization an indirect means of
influencing water use decision-making. Finally, we outline conditions under which riskiness
of water availability affects water use. These theoretical model results generate hypotheses
that can be tested empirically in future work.
2.2 Introduction
We live in an increasingly globalized world (Rosegrant et al., 2002; Hoekstra and Mekonnen,
2012), where trade in water-intensive commodities, such as agricultural products, represents
an important interaction between people and water resources (Allan, 1993). The relation-
ship between international trade and water resources is an issue of great interest in the
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literature (Hoekstra, 2010; Lenzen et al., 2013). A number of empirical studies have made
reference to classic international trade models, but it is not always clear what the theoretical
foundations of the models are and whether they are useful for the case of water (Wichelns ,
2015). Some studies have argued that economic models are inadequate for explaining virtual
water trade (Ansink , 2010), while others have sought to clarify the role of economics as it
relates to this issue (Reimer , 2012). Many studies focus on the relationship between trade
and virtual water resources (Hoekstra and Hung , 2005), without direct consideration of do-
mestic, physical water resources. A theoretical model that incorporates domestic water use
in production – in addition to the consumption and trade of water-intensive commodities –
would contribute to this growing literature. As such, the main goal of this paper is the de-
velopment of a trade model that addresses these relationships through the explicit inclusion
of water resources.
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model designed to emphasize several tradeoffs in
water use. First, the model captures competition for water among different sectors. Second,
the model allows for the possibility of factor substitutes for water, in the form of alternative
production technologies. An example is capital-intensive efficient irrigation technologies and
crop varietal improvements, a situation where increased use of one resource (in this case
capital) may be able to offset or substitute to some extent for water use. Third, we allow
for production and consumption to be substituted across locations in space through trade.
Fourth, we explicitly capture farmer risk aversion to variable water supplies, as compared
with traditional profit maximizing behavior.
The main goal of our model is to gain generalizable insights into the interactions be-
tween people and water in a trading economy. Transferable understanding is often difficult
to obtain when more realistic, but heavily parameterized, models are used to inform man-
agement of site-specific water resources. Hydro-economics has long been interested in the
interactions between people, water resources, and economics (Heinz et al., 2007), though
with a focus on finding feasible and optimal solutions to concrete problems, i.e. a ‘norma-
tive’ approach to model development (Sivapalan and Blöschl , 2015). This differs from the
development of models in the realm of coupled human and natural systems (Liu et al., 2007),
from which socio-hydrology stems (Sivapalan et al., 2014), which tend to focus on under-
standing what is happening in the system and why, following a ‘positive’ approach to model
development (Sivapalan and Blöschl , 2015). In this way, our model complements existing
hydro-economics models, which are typically parameterized to capture local dynamics and
inform management (Harou et al., 2009). Our modeling approach parallels that of socio-
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hydrology, yet we help to broaden socio-hydrology through the incorporation of economics.
By modeling domestic water use, agricultural production, and trade, we also present a the-
oretical foundation for the virtual water trade literature. In this way, we aim to contribute
to further integration of hydro-economics, socio-hydrology, and virtual water trade research.
The model is inspired by contemporary contexts – such as the current drought in California
– where water is a scarce resource. In this setting, in which there is much agricultural
production, competition exists between the agricultural sector and other parts of the economy
for scarce water resources. Additionally, uncertainty about the future supplies of water
resources impacts farmer decision-making. In contexts such as this, it is critical to understand
the ramifications of trade in water-intensive goods, as well as how various policies may impact
water use, agricultural production, and economic welfare. For this reason, a model that can
provide insight into these issues may be of interest to governments, planning authorities,
and non-governmental organizations dealing with scarce water resources. However, it is
important to recognize that theoretical models are necessarily abstractions of the real world
and are not intended to inform policy makers in a specific situation, unlike site-specific
integrated water resources management approaches (Howitt et al., 2010).
While the model is inspired by the real world, there is no validation because this is a theo-
retical model that abstracts the real world with necessarily restrictive assumptions. Our the-
oretical model is meant to provide a logically consistent framework for deriving results from
first economic principles, that is, from the interactions of consumer and producer decision-
making. For this reason, we employ many common assumptions of economic modeling, such
as equilibrium prices, rational behavior, and profit maximization. These assumptions are
pervasive in economic modeling, but rarely exist in the real world, making empirical valida-
tion difficult. For this reason, it is common for theoretical economic models to be developed
without validation against existing data (Baldassarre et al., 2015). However, our model en-
ables us to isolate some of the key parameters that can be empirically estimated in future
work. Additionally, our theoretical model generates hypotheses that can be tested with data
in specific circumstances in future research.
The approach undertaken in this paper does not involve prediction of bilateral trade
patterns among multiple countries; rather it applies to a small, open economy, in which water
is scarce. By ‘small’ we imply that we are concerned with a region that isn’t so important
to international trade that it can significantly influence the prices it pays for inputs and
the prices received for outputs; it takes these prices as given. By ‘open’ we imply that the
economy is influenced by supply and demand as reflected in prices received for outputs in
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the rest of the world. Our approach builds from the traditional two-factor and two-good
economic approach associated with Heckscher (1919) and Ohlin (1933), further refined and
extended in Samuelson (1971) and Jones (1971). In contrast to these general economics
approaches, we allow for water as an additional factor of production, do not assume that
capital is perfectly mobile between sectors, and allow for variability in water supplies and
hence prices. We go beyond classic studies such as Howitt and Taylor (1993) by considering
an economy that is open to international trade and has more than one sector, both of which
use more than one factor of production. We also relax the traditional profit maximizing
assumption to allow for variation in producer attitudes towards risk.
The paper is organized as follows. We first develop the model in Section 2.3. We
present two formulations: one that assumes profit maximization and one that enables farmer
decision-making under uncertainty. Next, we examine scenarios and policy interventions of
interest in Section 2.4. In Section 2.4, we ask the following questions: What happens to
water use when there is agricultural trade liberalization? What are the consequence of poli-
cies to tax water and subsidize water-saving technologies? How does water supply variability
impact water use? We conclude in Section 2.5.
2.3 Model Framework
We develop a theoretical model that captures the water resources tradeoffs outlined above.
This model stems from the classic 2x2x2 trade model, in which there are two regions, two
factors, and two goods. The model has explicit treatment of only one small country, but
has three factors, one of which is shared by the two sectors. We employ a static equilibrium
framework. Equilibrium is reached when prices equilibrate quantity supplied and demanded
across all markets in the economy (Arrow and Debreu, 1954). Representative human agents
operate in the model framework according to their objective, which is traditional profit max-
imization in Section 2.3.1 and maximization of expected utility under risk in Section 2.3.2.
Under traditional profit maximizing behavior farmers choose among alternative techniques
of production based upon the relative prices of inputs. Farmers choose the level of input
wherein the price that must be paid for it equals the marginal value product of that input,
which is the product of the extra output made possible by one more unit of input (marginal
physical product), and the price of the output. This model does not explicitly model multi-
ple regions and make bilateral trade predictions. It is a model of a domestic open economy,
in which production and trade are driven by external prices received for goods.
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A schematic displaying our model is provided in Figure 2.1. We assume that there is a home
country and the rest of the world. The country produces two goods: good 1 (agriculture) and
good 2 (manufacturing), which are also the two sectors/industries in the economy. There are
three factors in the model: factor 1 (agricultural capital), factor 2 (manufacturing capital),
and factor 3 (water). Agricultural production requires agricultural capital and water, while
manufacturing needs manufacturing capital and water. Water is mobile and costlessly re-
allocated between the two sectors, while capital is a specific factor to each sector. Water use
links sectors with one another, which is a unique feature of water (Savenije, 2002). In our
model, the common demand for water is the principal linkage between the two sectors, since
capital is sector-specific. In this way, the model explains intersectoral competition for water
resources.
In our model, we allow producers to substitute between factors. This is different from
the Leontief assumption – in which factors are assumed to be used in fixed proportions –
which is commonly applied when modeling agricultural water use (e.g. Kahil et al. (2015)
and Berrittella et al. (2007)). If farmers adopt efficient irrigation technology, such as drip
irrigation, or switch to water-saving crop varietals, this can be thought of as farmers sub-
stituting more capital in order to use less water. These substitutions require a monetary
outlay, represented in our model as agricultural capital. Ultimately, financial investment
enables the same quantity of good to be produced with less water.
The model works for situations in which there is a market for water – in which it is a scarce
good – such that obtaining an additional unit of water in one sector requires the other sector
to reduce its water use. As such, the model is not intended to depict rainfed agriculture.
To keep the analytical framework simple, we assume perfect competition in input (factor)
and output (goods) markets. It is assumed that goods are produced with constant returns
to scale technology, which means that a doubling of inputs results in a doubling of outputs.
Furthermore, the production function is increasing, concave and linearly homogenous, which
implies a diminishing marginal product of water and capital. Marginal product refers to the
change in output resulting from using one more unit of a particular input, assuming other
input quantities are fixed. We assume that inputs receive their value of marginal product,
although we will show how this changes under stochastic water supplies.
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2.3.1 Profit maximization
Farmers (or manufacturers) adjust their demand for capital and water so as to maximize
profit, which is determined by revenue minus the cost of capital and water per unit crop




Π1 = p1f1(x11, x31)− w1x11 − w3x31 (2.1)
max
x22,x32
Π2 = p2f2(x22, x32)− w2x22 − w3x32 (2.2)
where Πj is the profit in industry j; pj is the output price in industry j; fj() is the production
function in industry j; xij is the unconditional factor demand for factor i in industry j; and
wi is the factor price for input i (i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2).
The production function may be any functional form that maintains the following assump-
tions: (i) it is increasing with respect to either input, (ii) it is concave, meaning that the
second derivative is negative, and (iii) it is homogeneous of degree one in inputs, meaning
that a doubling of the inputs leads to a doubling of outputs, that is, there are constant
returns to scale in the production of each good.
We denote yj as the output supply in industry j:
y1 = f1(x11, x31) (2.3)
y2 = f2(x22, x32) (2.4)
Under constant returns to scale, equations (2.1) and (2.2) can be developed in terms of
one unit of production. So, producers in each industry choose factors to maximize profit
subject to the production technology required to produce one unit of each good:
max
a11,a31
π1 = p1 − w1a11 − w3a31 subject to f1(a11, a31) = 1 (2.5)
max
a22,a32
π2 = p2 − w2a22 − w3a32 subject to f2(a22, a32) = 1 (2.6)
where aij ≡ xij/yj is the conditional factor demand for factor i to produce one unit of good
in industry j; πj is the unit profit in industry j.
The first order conditions can be solved to derive the producer’s demand for inputs,
conditioned on a desire to produce one unit of output: a11 = a11(w1, w3), a31 = a31(w1,
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w3), a22 = a22(w2, w3), a32 = a32(w2, w3). It is important to emphasize that this is a much
more realistic approach than to assume that such coefficients are fixed. Assuming that a11
and a12 are fixed would make the analysis easier to solve later on, but would also simplify
things in a somewhat arbitrary manner.
Due to free entry and other competitive market assumptions, marginal revenue (price)
equals marginal cost in equilibrium:
p1 = w1a11(w1, w3) + w3a31(w1, w3) (2.7)
p2 = w2a22(w2, w3) + w3a32(w2, w3) (2.8)
Note that this differs from the Hecksher-Ohlin model (mentioned above) in that w1 and w2
are not identical prices for the same input (capital).
We do not need to make consumer preferences or demand curves explicit because of two
assumptions. One is that there are competitive market conditions, meaning that the price
for any good is equal to its marginal cost of production (any one who tries to sell for higher
than cost will not be able to sell, because someone else will enter and sell at cost). Second,
the economy of interest is ‘small’ relative to the rest of the world, meaning that it is not
large enough to affect the prices received for goods produced.
Now, totally differentiate the competitive profit condition and rearrange the equations to



























Denoting x̂ ≡ dx
x
, and θij ≡ aijwipj , the results can be written as
p̂1 = θ11ŵ1 + θ31ŵ3 (2.11)
p̂2 = θ22ŵ2 + θ32ŵ3 (2.12)
where x̂ is the percentage change of the variable x; θij is financial share of input i in good j
such that 0 < θij < 1, θ11 + θ31 = 1, and θ22 + θ32 = 1.
The total use of agricultural capital, manufacturing capital, and water (i.e. factor con-
straints) are denoted as V1, V2, and V3, respectively. The key set of equations for the factor
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markets are:








Wateragricuture: x31 = a31(w1, w3)y1 (2.15)
Watermanufacture: x32 = a32(w2, w3)y2 (2.16)
Watertotal: V3 = x31 + x32 = a31y1 + a32y2 (2.17)
Equations (2.13), (2.14), and (2.17) are the so-called ‘factor market clearing’ conditions,
and imply that a factor is used in its entirety. The market for water connects the two
industries. So rather than working with all three equations, we can restate equation (2.17)













































V̂3 = λ31V̂1 + λ32V̂2 + λ31 (â31 − â11) + λ32 (â32 − â22) (2.20)
where the notation of x̂ is the same as in equation (2.11) and (2.12), which is the percentage





is the fraction that industry 1 (agriculture)





is the fraction that industry 2 (manu-
facturing) uses of water (input 3), such that λ31 + λ32 = 1, 0 ≤ λ31 ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ λ32 ≤ 1.
Instead of leaving it in terms of the demand for inputs, it is useful to convert to input
return changes. To do this, we make use of the elasticity of substitution between the two






= −(â11 − â31)
(ŵ1 − ŵ3)
(2.21)
where F1 is the partial derivative of the production function (for sector 1) with respect to
input 1 (F1 =
∂f1(x11,x31)
∂x11
). F3 is the partial derivative of the production function (for sector
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The elasticity of substitution measures the substitutability between the two inputs in each
industry, which indicates how easy it is to substitute one for the other. A high value of the
elasticity of substitution implies that small changes in relative input prices leads to a large
shift in input use. In contrast, a small value of the elasticity of substitution implies that
changing the relative input prices does not impact input use much. In the limit, where the
elasticity of substitution is equal to zero, there is no response to a change in relative input
price; this is the case where there is no substitute for water.
Now, rewrite equation (2.20) by substituting equation (2.21) and (2.22):
V̂3 = λ31V̂1 + λ32V̂2 + λ31σ1 (ŵ1 − ŵ3) + λ32σ2 (ŵ2 − ŵ3) (2.23)
In summary, the results are:
p̂1 = θ11ŵ1 + θ31ŵ3 (2.24)
p̂2 = θ22ŵ2 + θ32ŵ3 (2.25)
V̂3 − λ31V̂1 − λ32V̂2 = λ31σ1 (ŵ1 − ŵ3) + λ32σ2 (ŵ2 − ŵ3) (2.26)
Note that equation (2.24), (2.25) and (2.26) are the same as equation (2.11), (2.12) and
(2.23) respectively, and are the key equations in the model.
An equivalent way of stating the system is: θ11 0 θ310 θ22 θ32






V̂3 − λ31V̂1 − λ32V̂2
 (2.27)
The conditional demand for input by sector (â11, â31, â22, â32) is variable:
â11 = −θ31σ1(ŵ1 − ŵ3) (2.28)
â31 = θ11σ1(ŵ1 − ŵ3) (2.29)
â22 = −θ32σ2(ŵ2 − ŵ3) (2.30)
15
â32 = θ22σ2(ŵ2 − ŵ3) (2.31)
Notations are the same as in equations (2.21) and (2.22).
Using the differentiated market clearing conditions for inputs 1 and 2, i.e. by differentiating
equations (2.13) and (2.14), we find that the change in output of the two goods is:
ŷ1 = V̂1 − â11 (2.32)
ŷ2 = V̂2 − â22 (2.33)
Finally, we can obtain the change in water use of the two sectors by differentiating equa-
tions (2.15) and (2.16):
x̂31 = â31 − ŷ1 (2.34)
x̂32 = â32 − ŷ2 (2.35)
2.3.2 Decision-making under uncertainty
The stochastic nature of water supplies is another aspect that makes water unique as a
factor of production. Under situations of risk and uncertainty in water supplies, decision-
makers may act differently than they do when they are solely concerned with maximizing
profit. Inter-annual variability in water supplies can be represented by shifts in the supply
curve, resulting in price fluctuations. These price fluctuations are due to variability in the
water supply, and are what induce behavior on the part of water users that differs from pure
profit maximizers in Section 2.3.1. Now, producers maximize their expected utility under
variable water supplies.
Here, we only consider industry 1 since results for industry 2 are analogous. The devel-
opment parallels that of Howitt and Taylor (1993), but, by contrast, is set in a three input,
two industry, open economy. The decision rule can be written:
Π = p1f1(x11, x31)− w1x11 − w3x31 (2.36)
where w3 is the random, imputed value of water, assumed to be normally distributed,
N(w̄3, σ
2), and where w̄3 is the expected water price and σ
2 is the variance of the water
price.
Further, we assume that firms in industry 1 and 2 have a utility function in profits,
16
maximize expected utility, and are risk averse. Accordingly:
maxE[u(Π)], u′(Π) > 0, u′′(Π) < 0 (2.37)
Substituting equation (2.36) into equation (2.37), the decision problem for a representative
producer is to maximize expected utility by choosing the input quantity (x11 and x31) given
the input and output price:
max
x11,x31
E[u(p1f1(x11, x31)− w1x11 − w3x31)] (2.38)
The two first order conditions of equation (2.38) that correspond to the two input choices
are given by setting the two first order derivatives of equation (2.38) with respect to x11 and
x31, to be zero:
E[u′(Π)(p1∂f1/∂x11 − w1)] = 0 (2.39)
E[u′(Π)(p1∂f1/∂x31 − w3)] = 0 (2.40)
The second order conditions of equation (2.38), likewise, are obtained by setting the two
second order derivatives to be less than zero:
E[u′′(Π)(p1∂f1/∂x11 − w1)2 + u′(Π)p1∂2f1/∂x211] < 0 (2.41)
E[u′′(Π)(p1∂f1/∂x31 − w3)2 + u′(Π)p1∂2f1/∂x231] < 0 (2.42)
This model framework enables us to derive the level of economic output and water use
when farmers face stochastic water supply, which we present in Section 2.4.4. An intuitive
explanation of these results will be given there.
2.4 Model Results
2.4.1 Scenario 1: Agricultural trade liberalization
Scenario 1 evaluates the impacts of agricultural trade liberalization. Suppose the home
country enters into a trade agreement in which a foreign country agrees to lower its barriers
on agricultural imports from the home country. This makes the agricultural good more
affordable to foreign buyers, and they increase their demand for it. This new demand
drives up the local price of the agricultural good (p̂1 > 0). We assume a water authority
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exists that chooses the price of agricultural water supplies (w3), which is not influenced
by trade liberalization negotiations. For example, it is unlikely that an irrigation district
in California would change the price of water charged to users due to trade negotiations;
however producers may have a higher demand for water should the price of their commodity
increase. To represent the fact that the price of water is set by an external agency and is
held constant, the price of agricultural water is an exogenous variable and is held constant
(ŵ3 = 0) in this scenario.
The total use of agricultural capital and manufacturing capital are also exogenous and
held constant in this scenario (V̂1 = 0, V̂2 = 0), since they will not necessarily be influenced
by free trade. This approach could be varied in future work, but in this case enables us to
evaluate the pure effect of trade liberalization on water resources controlling for investment.
It is possible that the region will invest more capital in response to the new demand following
trade liberalization, but this would be a policy response under our model framework, in which
V̂1 would need to be adjusted to introduce this.
In particular, the exogenous variables here are:
p̂1 > 0, p̂2 = 0, V̂1 = V̂2 = ŵ3 = 0
while the endogenous variables are:
ŵ1, ŵ2, V̂3
Under the imposed values, we can apply the control equations in our model (i.e. equations
(2.24)-(2.35)) to obtain values for all other variables in terms of percentage changes. These
results are summarized in Table 2.1.




p̂1 > 0 (2.43)
The unit water use in agriculture is given by:
â31 = σ1p̂1 > 0 (2.44)
So, according to equation (2.43) the percentage increase in water use (V̂3) is positively
correlated with the fraction of water use in agriculture (0 < λ31 < 1), the elasticity of
substitution between the two inputs (σ1 > 0), and the percentage increase in the price of
agriculture (p̂1 > 0). The percentage increase in water use is negatively correlated with the
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financial share of agricultural capital (0 < θ11 < 1). Under trade liberalization, V̂3 > 0 (refer
to Table 2.1), indicating that domestic water use increases. Note that x̂31 > 0 and x̂32 = 0
(refer to Table 2.1), indicating that the entire increase comes from agriculture. Parameters
in the production function determine the extent to which agricultural water use increases in
relation to the price of agriculture.
Data for Morocco – a water-scarce country – can help us to narrow down the value of key
parameters that determine the extent to which agricultural water use increases under trade
liberalization. In Morocco, approximately 87% of total freshwater withdrawals goes towards
agricultural production (World Bank , 2002), which provides a rough estimate of the fraction
of water use in agriculture (λ31 ≈ 87%). The cost share of water use in Morocco ranges
from 0.2% to 26% of total input costs (Tsur et al., 2004). That is, the financial share of
agcapital in agriculture varies from 74% to 99.8% (74% < θ11 < 99.8%). So, the total water
use increase depends largely on the elasticity of substitution (σ1).
Conversely, the use of agcapital will increase by proportionately less than water, illustrated
by the results â11 < 0 while â31 > 0 (refer to Table 2.1). In fact, an increase in water use
per unit of agricultural production (â31 > 0) suggests a decrease in agricultural water use
efficiency. This means that more water resources are used rather than capital-intensive
water-saving technologies, such as sophisticated irrigation equipment. This is because the
price of capital in agriculture (w1) increases, without a subsequent increase in the price of
water.
As discussed above, total water use (V̂3) and unit agricultural water use (â31) are strongly
influenced by the substitution elasticity (σ1). σ1 reflects the ability of capital to be substi-
tuted for water, when water is either unavailable or relatively expensive. Potential values
of σ1 range from zero to infinity, which results in a broad range of V̂3. σ1 equals infinity
when water and capital are perfect substitutes in production: if water is in short supply, we
can fully compensate for it by using more of another input. If σ1 equals zero, then there is
no substitute for water. In this case, free trade has no effect on total water use (V̂3 = 0).
Both of these boundary values for σ1 are unrealistic: it is more likely that some substitution
with water is possible. The Leontief assumption might underestimate the effect of trade
liberalization on total water use. This is because the Leontief assumption assumes a small
elasticity of substitution, such that trade liberalization will result in only a modest increase
in the total water use. This is consistent with findings in the literature (e.g. Calzadilla et al.
(2011)). A more realistic estimate may be the well-known Cobb-Douglas assumption, in
which σ1 = 1. When σ1 = 1 the total water use will increase in proportion to the price of
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agriculture.
Trade liberalization that raises the agricultural price – without subsequent price adjust-
ments in water – has no effect on manufacturing; all the parameters in industry 2 remain
unchanged. Agricultural output increases in order to meet the new demand of the foreign
country under trade liberalization, which improves the economic performance of producers
in the home country. However, these economic gains come at the expense of water resources;
water resource use increases and agricultural water-use efficiency declines. It should be noted
that these results depend on the model assumptions that we have made; different assump-
tions could be made that may lead trade liberalization to impact water use in a different
way. We have attempted to provide a framework for such future investigations.
2.4.2 Scenario 2: Target tax on water
Total water use increased under trade liberalization in Scenario 1. If viewed as undesirable,
one potential policy response to reduce this increase in water use could be to increase its
price. Here, we explore if a water tax exists that reduces water use without offsetting the
economic gains from trade liberalization. We derive the level of a tax on water that would
counteract the increased water use under trade liberalization. The tax level targets a certain
level of water use, so we refer to this tax level as a ‘target tax’.
In this scenario, there is agricultural trade liberalization, with increased foreign demand
for the water-intensive agricultural good (p̂1 > 0). The water authority adjusts w3 such that
water use will remain at pre-liberalization levels, that is, V3 is held constant; V̂3 = 0. The
water authority can act such that, in effect, the water use charge (w3) is an endogenous
variable. Allowing w3 to be endogenous is a way of imputing what its tax might be to return
water use to pre-liberalization levels.
In this scenario, the exogenous variables are:
p̂1 > 0, p̂2 = 0, V̂1 = V̂2 = V̂3 = 0
while the endogenous variables are:
ŵ1, ŵ2, ŵ3
If we apply the control equations in our model (e.g. equations (2.24)-(2.35)), we obtain
results for all other variables. These are summarized in Table 2.1. Results for Scenario 2
in Table 2.1 show the percent change in parameters compared to a base case with no trade
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liberalization and no water tax. Differences between the columns for Scenario 1 and Scenario
2 in Table 2.1 indicate the direct impact of the water tax under trade liberalization.
From Table 2.1, it is clear that agricultural production increases, but not by as much as
it does under Scenario 1. This is due to the increased price of water under the target tax in
Scenario 2. In Scenario 2, the total water use does not change. However, note that water use
increases in agriculture (x̂31 > 0) are offset by declining water use in manufacturing (x̂32 < 0)
to keep total water use constant. In manufacturing, capital tends to be substituted for water,
since water is relatively more expensive now (ŵ3 > 0, ŵ2 < 0).
These results illustrate that the target tax is proportionately smaller than increases in
agricultural prices under trade liberalization. This framework provides a way to estimate







p̂1 < p̂1 (2.45)
Note that the target tax, ŵ∗3, depends on the fraction of water use, substitution elasticity







, all of which are positive). Thus, the finding that ŵ3 < p̂1 demonstrates that a tax –
that is proportionately smaller than the percentage increase in the agricultural price (p̂1) –
is large enough to offset the increase of water use resulting from trade liberalization.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the percentage change in model parameters for various values of the
water tax. Figure 2.2 highlights the increasing intersectoral competition for water as water
becomes more valuable. Water use in both sectors falls as the price of water increases, yet at
different rates, determined by its elasticity of substitution (σ1 and σ2) and financial share of
capital (θ11 and θ22). Total water use returns to pre-liberalization levels (V̂3 = 0) at the target
tax ŵ∗3, by definition. However, these reductions in water use are accompanied by further
reductions in agricultural output, until the gains from trade are completely eliminated when
ŵ3 = p̂1, since ŷ1 = 0 (refer to Figure 2.2d). Additionally, ŷ2 < 0 for all tax levels (refer to
Figure 2.2e). In other words, for the tax level ŵ3 = p̂1 agricultural output returns to pre-
liberalization levels, while manufacturing output is reduced for any level of the tax, indicating
reduced economic performance. Thus, tradeoffs exist between economic performance and
resource use – which must be carefully considered – in order to determine implications of
the target tax.
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2.4.3 Scenario 3: Subsidize investment in agriculture
In this scenario, we explore another potential policy option to reduce water use. In this case
there is additional investment in the agriculture sector, which might arise from government
interventions that are external to the scope of the model. Not all investment in agricultural
capital will reduce water use; we restrict our attention to those that do, such as water-saving
technologies.
Here, the use of capital in agriculture is increased, such that V̂1 > 0. In this scenario,
there is no trade liberalization, so p̂1 = 0, because there is no additional foreign demand for
agricultural goods. So, the exogenous variables in this scenario are:
p̂1 = 0, p̂2 = 0, V̂1 > 0, V̂2 = V̂3 = 0
while the endogenous variables are:
ŵ1, ŵ2, ŵ3
Under the imposed values, we apply the control equations in our model (e.g. equations
(2.24)-(2.35)) and obtain results for all other variables. These are summarized in Table 2.1.
Results for Scenario 3 in Table 2.1 show the percent change in parameters compared to a
base case with no trade liberalization and no subsidy to agcapital.
The finding that ŵ3 > 0 implies that water has become relatively expensive in comparison
to agricultural capital. Returns to specific inputs (e.g. cost of agricultural capital and
manufacturing capital) fall to offset the increase in water price, shown by ŵ1 < 0 and ŵ2 < 0
(refer to Table 2.1). Notably, agricultural production increases under this scenario (Note
that ŷ1 > 0 under Scenario 3 in Table 2.1). Since agricultural production increases while
water use remains fixed, the unit water use decreases (i.e. water-use efficiency increases).
Since water-saving technologies become cheaper in this scenario, producers substitute away
from water, which might be the goal of the public intervention.
An implication of this scenario is that mechanisms exist by which producers use less
water without reducing agricultural production. It is thus an indirect means of influencing
water use decision-making. Subsidizing agricultural capital – combined with other relevant
policies – provides a policy mechanism to reduce water use without targeting water resources
explicitly. One downside is that would shift government resources away from other activities,
and a complete analysis would need to examine how the capital investment is paid for. A
broader, more detailed general equilibrium model with an explicit role for government and
public finance would be needed to fully explore this issue.
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2.4.4 Scenario 4: Stochastic water supplies
In this scenario, water supplies are stochastic, which is an important feature of water
resources. Variability in water supplies can result in variability in the price paid for water
(w3) as discussed in section 2.3.2. For example, a farmer may have riparian rights for a river
whose flow varies from year to year. The rental value of water also will have a distribution
in this case. Previous studies have examined the impact of variable water input prices on
the decision to adopt precision irrigation technology (Schoengold and Sunding , 2014), but
have not yet considered trade implications.
Here, we apply the model described in Section 2.3.2 and obtain the following results:
p1∂f1/∂x11 = w1 (2.46)
p1∂f1/∂x31 > w̄3 (2.47)
Equation (2.46) is a standard result in a competitive market setting. This result highlights
the fact that the value marginal product of input 1 is equivalent to the exogenously deter-
mined price of input 1, which is the same as the result in equilibrium without a stochastic
water price.
Equation (2.47) provides a finding similar to Howitt and Taylor (1993), but is an extension
to a trade setting, with more than one sector and with multiple factors of production. The
left hand side (LHS) of Equation (2.47) presents the agricultural output multiplied by the
extra agricultural output that can be derived from one more unit of water. The right hand
side (RHS) of equation (2.47) presents what must be paid for that water. In the absence
of water risk, the LHS and RHS would be equal (as in the previous equation). This would
mean that the producer would keep procuring more water up to the point that the extra
revenue from it equals the cost of getting the water. However, what we show under stochastic
supplies and risk aversion, is that the producer does not obey this rule. Instead, they have
to be guaranteed a return in excess of what they pay for the water (on average). In essence
the producer is giving up potential revenue, on average.
Thus, equation (2.47) suggests expected utility is maximized when the value marginal
product exceeds the expected factor cost. This is a very important result. It means that
producers will cut back on water use simply because of uncertainty. The additional revenue
derived from obtaining more water must be strictly greater than the price of obtaining more
water, in order to induce producers to make this expansion.
The above result is based on the assumption that producers are risk averse and does not
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hold if producers are not risk averse. However, we do not make any assumptions about their
level of risk aversion. The amount that producers cut back on water use is associated with
their level of risk aversion and may also be distorted by existing policies, such as insurance
contracts. Producer levels of risk aversion remains an empirical question that we necessarily
leave to future work. What makes this scenario different from the other scenarios is that
water availability is stochastic and producers are not indifferent to the associated risks. It
implies there is a behavioral response to stochastic water supplies that leads to a reduction in
water use. In this way, this approach is more general than the profit-maximizing assumption
used to derive earlier results. Note that when water supplies are not stochastic, the expected
utility maximization behavioral approach of section 2.3.2 yields equivalent results to that
of profit maximization. In fact, we could have used the (more complicated) expected utility
maximization approach through the paper, with no changes in results.
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a model that captures the mechanistic relationships between
water as a domestic factor of production, as well as the consumption and trade of water-
intensive commodities. We focus on four tradeoffs that are important in water-use decision-
making. The first tradeoff concerns water allocation among different sectors. The second
tradeoff highlights substitution possibilities in production, which means that, under certain
circumstances, there may be a substitute for water (or at least a way to conserve water), such
as water-saving technologies that require capital investments. The third tradeoff highlights
that production and consumption can be substituted across regions, in which trade lends
flexibility and efficiency to the system. The fourth tradeoff considers how farmers change
their behavior to account for production risk.
We show that inclusion of stochastic water supplies into the model induces producers to
reduce their demand for water, which is an unclear relationship ex-ante. Other results show
the conditions under which agricultural trade liberalization influences water use, depending
on the elasticity of substitution of water. An important result is that a target tax – which
offsets the increase in water consumption due to trade liberalization – can be proportionately
smaller than the increase in agricultural output price. Subsidizing capital in the agricultural
sector may lead to the adoption of advanced technologies, such as drip irrigation and water
saving seed and fertilizer technologies, which increases water-use efficiency and reduces water
consumption in agriculture. This highlights the fact that policies that are not directly focused
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on water resources may have a significant impact on water use. This may be helpful in
situations in which direct water policies are politically unpalatable.
The model that we presented in this paper contribute to the further integration of the
hydro-economics, socio-hydrology, and virtual water trade literatures. The motivation of
our model was to develop generalizable insights into the interactions between people and
water resources. In this way, our approach parallels that of socio-hydrology, while broaden-
ing socio-hydrology by explicitly incorporating economics. Our theoretical model comple-
ments existing hydro-economics models, which are typically parameterized to capture local
dynamics with the goal of improving water resources management. Additionally, our model
provides a theoretical foundation for virtual water trade research.
The strength of our analysis has been to capture the tradeoffs that exist for water use
decision-making between sectors, factors, trading partners, and with uncertainty. Signifi-
cantly, our model enables these linkages and mechanisms to be displayed in a simple and
coherent framework, in which all assumptions are clearly stated. That said, our analysis
has left unexamined a number of issues that may be important in certain circumstances.
Future extensions to the model may consider the implications of infrastructure and distinct
sources of water, such as rainfall, surface irrigation supplies, and groundwater supplies. The
integration of theory with empirical analyses represents a particularly important direction
for future research.
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Figure 2.2: Percentage change in the model parameters with the water tax (ŵ3). When
ŵ3 = 0, then no water tax is present and only trade liberalization holds. The target tax on
water is shown by ŵ∗3. The boundary value for the tax (p̂1) indicates the value of the tax
for which agricultural price increases due to liberalization are eliminated. The model
parameters shown are the percentage change in (a) water use, (b) water demand for unit
agricultural output, (c) water demand for unit manufacturing output, (d) agriculture
output, (e) manufacturing output, (f) agricultural capital price, and (g) manufacturing
capital price. Water use returns to pre-liberalization levels at the target tax by definition
(V̂3 = 0). At tax levels greater than ŵ∗3, water use continues to fall, as does agricultural
output, until the gains from trade are completely eliminated when ŵ3 = p̂1, since ŷ1 = 0.
28
Chapter 3
TRADE OPENNESS AND DOMESTIC WATER USE
3.1 Abstract
We contribute to the debate over globalization and the environment by asking: What is
the impact of trade on national water use? To address this question we employ econometric
methods to quantify the causal relationship between trade openness and water use. Specifi-
cally, we use the instrumental variables methodology to evaluate the impact of trade openness
on domestic water withdrawals in agriculture and industry. We find that trade openness does
not have a significant impact on total or industrial water withdrawals. However, we show
that a one percentage point increase in trade openness leads to a 5.21% decrease in agri-
cultural water withdrawals. We find that trade openness reduces water use in agriculture
primarily through the intensive margin effect, by leading farmers to produce more with less
water, such as through the adoption of technology. We do not find evidence for extensive
margin or crop mix impacts on agricultural water withdrawals. Significantly, these results
demonstrate that trade openness leads to less water use in agriculture. This finding has
broad scientific and policy relevance as we endeavor to untangle causal relationships in the
complex global food system and develop policies to achieve water and food security.
3.2 Introduction
There has been a recent explosion in research on the water-trade nexus. An extensive
literature has developed on the water resources embodied in traded goods (i.e. ‘virtual
water trade’) (Hoekstra and Hung , 2005; Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012). Work in this area
began with the observation that trade may ‘save’ local water resources of the importing
country (Allan, 1993). This idea generated extensive work on trade-based global water
savings (GWS) (de Fraiture et al., 2004; Chapagain et al., 2006; Dalin et al., 2012). GWS
determines the theoretical volume of water that would have been consumed in the absence of
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trade (i.e. autarky, or if all importing nations instead produced the goods that they import
themselves) compared with how much water was actually consumed under the existing trade
system (Konar et al., 2016). The global trade system has been shown to save (virtual) water
resources (Chapagain et al., 2006). Now, there is a critical need to better understand the
implications of trade for domestic (physical) water use.
The impact of trade on water use remains an open question. Dang et al. (2016) present
a theoretical model of trade and domestic water resources, showing the conditions under
which trade liberalization will impact water use. Reimer (2014) show that trade liberalization
may be neutral from a water resources perspective, but improves welfare and may enable
countries to better deal with shocks. Berrittella et al. (2008) show that the impacts of trade
liberalization are likely to be non-linear and reduce water use in water scarce countries, but
increase water use in water rich countries. Liu et al. find that international trade buffers the
impacts of the projected future shortfalls in irrigation. Konar et al. (2016) determine that
free trade leads to greater GWS under a changing climate. On the other hand, Hoekstra
(2009) suggests that the export of water-intensive commodities will increase water use and
scarcity in exporting nations. Zhao et al. (2015) find that virtual water flows exacerbate
water stress in China. Metulini et al. (2016) show that trade induced by human migration
is detrimental to the water resources of some countries.
The goal of this paper is to understand the impact of trade openness on national water
use. Trade openness is typically measured as total imports and exports as a fraction of
economic activity (i.e. GDP). Importantly, we are interested in the causal impact of trade
openness on domestic water use. A cross-country regression of water use on trade openness
may not reflect the causal impact of trade openness on water use. There are two main
problems with inferring causality from a cross-sectional regression. First, reverse causality
may exist. Access to abundant water resources may enable countries to produce and trade
more. Second, endogeneity distorts our interpretation of regression results.
A common cause of endogeneity is that a confounder variable is impacting both the in-
dependent (trade openness) and dependent (water use) variables. For example, wealthy
countries are more likely to be both more open to trade (as predicted by the gravity model
of international trade (Tinbergen, 1962)) and to use advanced production technologies that
enable them to use water more efficiently, potentially using less. This would lead us to under-
estimate the impact of trade on water use. Conversely, if these wealthy countries implement
policies such as agricultural subsidies they are likely to boost their agricultural production,
leading to more trade and more water use. In this case, the correlational relationship be-
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tween trade and water withdrawals will be overestimated. Using countries’ trade policies
instead of trade openness does not solve the problem. This is because countries that adopt
free trade policies may do so precisely because they have the water resources required to
meet the increased production demands that will come with trade liberalization.
To understand the causal impact of trade openness on domestic water use we turn to
instrumental variables (IV). Frankel and Romer (1999) introduced the use of the geographical
determinants of trade to ‘instrument’ for trade and establish the causal impact of trade on
economic growth. Geographic factors determine trade, as given by the gravity model of
trade (Tinbergen, 1962). Yet, geographic attributes are likely to be exogenous to outcome
variables of interest (Frankel and Romer , 1999). This makes geographic variables a suitable
instrument for trade openness. Irvin and Tervi (2002) employ the same IV approach for
a larger sample of years to establish the impact of trade on income, corroborating earlier
findings of Frankel and Romer (1999). Geographical determinants of trade are also used to
infer the causal impact of trade on air pollution (Frankel and Rose, 2005; Managi et al.,
2009). These studies explicitly address the endogeneity of trade and the outcome variable
of interest.
Kagohashi et al. (2015) estimate the impact of trade on water use with an IV approach
to address endogeneity between trade and water use. However, Kagohashi et al. (2015)
use panel data which includes time-varying GDP which might bias their results. Generally,
panel data is inappropriate to use when the geographic determinants of trade are used as an
instrument for trade. This is because the geographic determinants do not change in time.
For this reason, a cross-sectional study is more appropriate. Specifically, GDP is the only
time-varying variable in the set of instruments in Kagohashi et al. (2015). For this reason,
GDP might dominate the constructed trade openness, and thus dominate the estimate of the
causal effect. An IV approach that uses cross-sectional data rather than panel data would
improve upon the estimate provided by Kagohashi et al. (2015). Additionally, Kagohashi
et al. (2015) determine the impact of trade openness on total water withdrawals, ignoring
potential differences in withdrawals by economic sector.
We contribute to the debate over globalization and the environment by asking: What
is the impact of trade on national water use? Importantly, we use an IV methodology to
determine the causal impact of trade openness on domestic agricultural and industrial water
use. Our IV methodology follows the approach first employed in the seminal work of Frankel
and Romer (1999), in which geographic variation is used to instrument for trade, based on
the gravity model of trade. Here, we build upon the work of Kagohashi et al. (2015) in three
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important ways. First, we use cross-sectional rather than panel data. Second, we distinguish
between agricultural and industrial water use. Third, we evaluate the mechanisms driving
agricultural water use. We detail our data and methods in Section 3.3. Our results are
presented in Section 3.4. We conclude in Section 3.5.
3.3 Methods
Here, we describe our methods. In Section 3.3.1, we detail the data we use on international
trade, geographic attributes, agricultural production, and water use. Table 3.1 lists all data
sources used in this study. In Section 3.3.2 we explain the instrumental variables (IV)
technique for causal inference.
3.3.1 Data
We collect data from a variety of sources. This is because we require information on
bilateral trade, national trade openness, geographic attributes, agricultural production, and
water use. For all variables, we collect country level cross-sectional information for the year
2002, or as close as possible when 2002 is not available. We restrict our analysis to a single
year due to limitations in the water use database. The year 2002 is the most recent year
with the largest available sample size for water withdrawal data.
Bilateral trade: Data on bilateral trade are collected from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) (International Monetary Fund, Direction
of Trade Statistics (DOTS), 2015). The DOTS reports bilateral trade in value [$] among
all IMF member states, some non-member countries, the world, and major areas. Imports
are reported on a cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) basis and exports are reported on a
free on board (FOB) basis, with the exception of a few countries for which imports are also
available FOB. Data is available with monthly and quarterly temporal frequency starting
in 1960. Annual data are available from 1947 to 1960. Time series data includes estimates
derived from reports of partner countries for non-reporting and slow-reporting countries. We
select the year 2002 in which bilateral trade data is reported for 185 countries.
Trade openness: The classic definition of trade openness is total trade as a fraction of total
economic activity. Total economic activity is typically measured by gross domestic product






where T refers to trade openness, ‘Imports’ refers to gross imports of goods and services
in value terms, ‘Exports’ refers to gross exports of goods and services in value terms, total
economic activity is proxied with GDP, and c serves as an index for country c. Trade openness
measures the proportion of economic activity encapsulated in trade. For this reason, trade
openness is sometimes referred to as the ‘trade share’ or ‘trade intensity’. To quantify trade
openness, we obtain data on total import value, total export value, and GDP (all in [$]) for
each country from the World Bank data portal (World Bank , 2015). We map our constructed
log trade openness variable in Figure 3.1.
Geography: The primary source for geographical variables are from the GeoDist database (Mayer
and Zignago, 2011) accessed through CEPII Research and Expertise on the World econ-
omy (CEPII , 2015). CEPII produces data on the world economy and provides a database of
geographic variables for the estimation of the gravity model of international trade. Variables
provided include geographic bilateral distances, border indicator, trade and money agree-
ments, cultural data, language, and colonial history from 1948 to 2015. From GeoDist, we
collect information on national area, landlocked dummy variable, border dummy variable,
and the distance between pairs of countries. We also use latitude and dummy variables for
region from the World Bank data portal (World Bank , 2015).
Population: Our data on population come from United Nations Population Division (UNPD ,
2015), which we access from the World Bank data portal. Total population (thousands) are
collected.
Weather: We use both the area-weighted and population-weighted annual average pre-
cipitation and temperature data from Dell et al. (2012). Dell et al. (2012) aggregate high
resolution monthly historical weather data to the country year level. Their weather data is
taken from the Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation: 1900-2006 Gridded Monthly
Time Series, Version 1.01 (Matsuura and Willmott , 2007). This weather data is aggregated
to the country-year level using either population or area as the weights.
Climate: The climate data are from Portland State University (2015). Portland State
University (2015) take the Koeppen-Geiger climate zones map from Strahler and Strahler
(1992). Then, they calculate the percent land area and population in each climate zone at
the country-year level in equal area projection.
Agricultural production: Information on agriculture are collected from the Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations Statistics Division (FAOSTAT) (FAOSTAT ,
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2015). In particular, we collect data on the agricultural production [tonnes], harvested area
[Ha], and yield [tonnes Ha−1] from FAOSTAT. We select five major crops due to data limi-
tation: rye, wheat, barley, maize, and oats. We also use the production data for total cereal
in value. Data on the value of total agricultural production in each country are collected
from the World Bank data portal. We select information on all agricultural commodities for
our analysis.
Water use: To measure water use, we use information on water withdrawals provided
by the AQUASTAT database of the FAO (AQUASTAT , 2015), which we access from the
World Bank data portal. AQUASTAT is the global water information system of the FAO.
AQUASTAT collects, analyzes and disseminates data and information by country on water
resources, water uses, and agricultural water management. Aquastat provides information on
water withdrawals by source (i.e. surface, groundwater). Aquastat also provides information
on water withdrawals by sector (i.e. agriculture, industry). Unfortunately, the combined
classification is not available (i.e. fraction of agricultural withdrawals from surface supplies,
etc.).
Annual freshwater withdrawals refer to total water withdrawals, not counting evapora-
tion losses from storage basins. Withdrawals also include water from desalination plants in
countries where they are a significant source. It is possible for withdrawals to exceed total
renewable resources. This could occur if there is extraction from nonrenewable aquifers,
desalination plants produce considerable water resources, or where there is significant water
reuse. Withdrawals for agriculture are total withdrawals for irrigation and livestock produc-
tion. Withdrawals for industry are for direct industrial use, which includes withdrawals to
cool thermoelectric power plants. AQUASTAT also provides information on withdrawals for
domestic uses, including drinking water, municipal use or supply, and use for public services,
commercial establishments, and homes.
We select data on annual freshwater withdrawals by sector (i.e. agriculture, industry).
Unfortunately, water withdrawals data by source is too sparse for our analysis. For each
country, we choose information for the most recent year available from 1987 to 2002. This
is because 2002 is the year with the most countries provided in the database. We map log
water withdrawals for agriculture in Figure 3.2.
Industry-related variables: We collect variables to estimate the level of industrial develop-
ment of a nation. We collect number of employed workers and estimated net fixed standard-
ized capital stock in 2005 purchasing power parity from Extended Penn World Tables (Mar-
quetti , 2012). The total count of patents in force by application origin for year 2004 is from
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World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO , 2017). We select these years since they
are the closest available years to 2002 (i.e. the year of most complete water withdrawal
data).
3.3.2 Causal Inference with Instrumental Variables
The relationship between trade openness and water withdrawals is shown in the following
regression equation:
Wc,s = βTc + γ
TXc + υ. (3.2)
where Wc,s is water withdrawals of economic sector s in country c, Tc is the trade openness
of country c, Xc is a set of control variables, and υ is the error term, which is assumed to
be independent, identical, and normally distributed. The coefficient of interest is β, which
is a scalar and corresponds to trade openness. γ is a vector and represents the coefficients
corresponding to the set of control variables for country c. National level values of W and T
are mapped in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Visually, it is not clear how trade openness
and agricultural water withdrawals are correlated.
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression approach is used in many empirical studies
to explore the relationship between two variables. OLS estimates the partial correlation
between the two variables of interest. In many cases, simply knowing the correlation between
two variables is insufficient for understanding their causal relationship. This is true even
with carefully chosen control variables. This is because there may be reverse causality or
an unobserved confounding factor that is driving both outcomes. For the case of trade
openness and water withdrawals, wealthy countries are more likely to be more open to
trade. These countries are also more likely to adopt water-saving technologies which may
enable them to withdraw less water. This will result in a downward OLS estimate for the
relationship between trade openness and domestic water withdrawals. Conversely, policies
such as agricultural subsidies in wealthy nations may boost agricultural production, leading
to more trade and more water withdrawals. In this case, the OLS relationship between trade
openness and water withdrawals will be overestimated. So, it is essential to isolate the trade
share that is correlated with water withdrawals yet uncorrelated with other unobservable
determinants of water use.
In order to isolate the causal impact of trade openness on water withdrawals, we use an
‘instrumental variables’ (IV) or ‘two-stage least squares’ approach (Angrist and Pischke,
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2009; Wooldridge, 2010). For this approach to work, a variable must be identified that
is (1) strongly correlated with trade openness and (2) uncorrelated with any unobservable
determinants of the outcome of interest, in this case, water withdrawals, except through
trade. Such a variable is known as an ‘instrument’. In the ‘first stage’ of an instrumental
variables estimation, the variation in the endogenous variable that is driven by another
variable that is only related to the ultimate outcome of interest through the endogenous
variable is isolated. In the ‘second stage’, the predicted value of the endogenous variable
from the first stage is used as the independent variable to obtain a causal estimate.
To construct an instrument for trade openness we follow Frankel and Romer (1999) and
employ information about the geographic attributes of a country. Frankel and Romer (1999)
used the geographic factors of a country, such as area, population, and distance to neighbors,
to determine the impact of trade openness on income. Geographic factors determine trade,
as given by the gravity model of trade. Yet, these geographic attributes are exogenous to
outcome variables of interest (Frankel and Romer , 1999). So, geographic variables are a
suitable instrument for trade openness. For this reason, geographic variables have been used
in an IV framework to determine the impact of trade on several outcome variables of interest,
including air pollution (Frankel and Rose, 2005) and environmental policy (Andonova et al.,
2007).
First, we estimate the log transform of the bilateral trade share (τij ≡ log tijGDPi ) using ge-
ographic factors. We use bilateral trade between country i and j (tij) over GDP in country
i (GDPi) as the bilateral trade share, then we take the log transform to get the depen-
dent variable (τij). We use GDPi because we want to get an instrument for Opennessi
(= Ti/GDPi). So we estimate Tij/GDPi first. Then we sum this for all j to get Opennessi.
For predictors, we follow those introduced by Frankel and Romer (1999), which stems from
the gravity model of international trade, in which the bilateral trade between countries is
proportional to the GDP of the two countries and negatively correlated with the distance
between the countries. In this instrument, only geographic attributes are used as predictors
and GDP is omitted because of potential endogeneity with the outcome variable of interest.
To specify, the log transform of the bilateral trade share between country i and j for country





= a0 + a1log(Dij) + a2log(Pi) + a3log(Ai) + a4log(Pj) + a5log(Aj)
+ a6(LLi + LLj) + a7Bij + a8Bijlog(Dij) + a9Bijlog(Pi) + a10Bijlog(Ai)
+ a11Bijlog(Pj) + a12Bijlog(Aj) + a13Bij(LLi + LLj) + eij
(3.3)
where tij is the bilateral trade in value (the sum of import value and export value) between
country i and country j. D is for distance, P is for population, A is for land area, LL is a
landlocked dummy, which indicates whether the country is landlocked or not, B is a border
dummy, which indicates whether the two countries share a common border or not. The
interaction terms between the border dummy and all of the other explanatory variables are
included in this model. The subscripts i, j refer to country i and country j, respectively.
In this way, τij refer to element i, j in a matrix of all estimated bilateral trade shares.
Based on Eq 3.3, we get the estimated bilateral trade share (τ̂ij) for all pairs of i and j
(i 6= j), which forms matrix τ̂ . Note that the matrix τ̂ is not symmetric (i.e. τij 6= τji).
τij ≡ log tijGDPi , while τji ≡ log
tji
GDPj
. The numerators are the same (i.e. tij = tji) because
they are the total bilateral trade flow between country i and j. Yet the denominators are
GDPs for country i and j respectively, which are different.
Our bilateral equation differs from the method employed in Kagohashi et al. (2015) in
both dependent and independent variables. Kagohashi et al. (2015) include GDP as a pre-
dictor variable, which is potentially endogenous and might dominate the prediction. In our
specification, we omit GDP to ensure that the predicted trade share only depends upon
geographic characteristics (i.e. not GDP). For the dependent variable, unlike Kagohashi
et al. (2015), in which bilateral trade flow is predicted, we predict the bilateral trade share
directly. Our method allows us to directly construct trade openness based on this bilateral
trade share. Kagohashi et al. (2015) estimate total trade based on the predicted bilateral
trade flow and then divide by GDP to obtain trade openness. However, their inclusion of
GDP in the denominator might introduce bias due to its potential endogeneity. In this
way, our methodology builds and improves upon the methodology used in Kagohashi et al.
(2015), by using geographic attributes to construct an instrument for trade openness follow-
ing Frankel and Romer (1999).
Second, as in Frankel and Romer (1999), the instrument for trade openness for country







where T̂i is the constructed trade openness, which is the instrument in our model.

























is the vector of the estimated coefficients in Eq 3.3. Xij is the vector of all the inde-
pendent variables between country i and country j as in Eq 3.3 (i.e. Dij, Pi, Ai, Pj, Aj, LLi+
LLj, Bij, and the interaction terms). Since we are assuming eij to be homoscedastic,
E(exp(eij)|Xij) is a constant for all the observations. In this case, the instrument equals∑
j 6=i exp(τ̂ij) times a constant. We ignore this constant term since it makes no difference in
the following IV methodology.
We use the constructed trade openness (T̂i) as the instrument for trade openness, and
apply the IV method to estimate the causal effect of trade openness on water withdrawals.
The second stage of the estimation takes the predicted values for T̂i and uses those as the
independent variable.
The IV procedure is provided in Eq 3.6 and 3.7. The first stage is provided in Eq 3.6.
In Eq 3.6, the endogenous variable, i.e. the real trade openness (T), is regressed on the
constructed trade openness variable (T̂ ) and control variables, Xc. The second stage is
provided in Eq 3.7. In Eq 3.7, log water withdrawals (W ) are regressed on predicted values
of real trade openness, denoted as T̃ , and controls, Xc.
Ti = b0 + b1T̂i + b
T
2 Xc + ui (3.6)
log(Wi) = c0 + c1T̃i + c
T
2 Xc + vi (3.7)
We apply the statistical t-test to determine if the coefficient t is significant. This requires
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that we estimate the standard errors for coefficients. To estimate the standard errors we
use the variance-covariance matrix, in which the elements in the diagonal (aii) provide the
variance of the corresponding coefficient (bi) (i.e. aii = variance(bi)). The usual IV standard
error formula is the estimated variance-covariance matrix from 2SLS. However, we also need
to account for the fact that our instrument depends on the parameters of the bilateral trade
equation (i.e. Eq 3.3), as pointed out by Frankel and Romer (1999). As such, we estimate
the variance-covariance matrix as the usual IV formula plus the variance-covariance coming
from the instrument construction. Specifically, the estimated variance-covariance matrix of
the coefficients equals the usual IV formula plus (∂ĉ/∂â)Ω̂(∂ĉ/∂â)
′
, where ĉ is the vector of
estimated coefficients in Eq 3.7, â is the vector of estimated coefficients in Eq 3.3, and Ω̂ is
the estimated variance-covariance matrix of a (Frankel and Romer , 1999).
3.4 Results and Discussion
Here, we present and discuss results on the relationship between trade openness and water
withdrawals. First, we present the results of our bilateral trade share equation. Then, we
check the quality and robustness of our IV estimate. Next, we compare the correlational
(OLS) and causal (IV) estimates of the relationship between trade openness and water with-
drawals. Finally, we examine a few potential mechanisms for the impact of trade openness
on agricultural water withdrawals.
3.4.1 Bilateral trade share
Table 3.2 presents results for the bilateral trade share (Eq 3.3), in which only geographic
attributes are used as predictors and GDP is omitted due to potential endogeneity concerns.
Table 3.2 provides evidence that most of the geographic attributes included in the model
are statistically significant determinants of trade openness. The coefficient for log transform
of distance (log(Dij) = −1.430∗∗∗) is negative. This is consistent with the gravity model of
international trade, in which bilateral trade between countries is negatively correlated with
the distance between the two countries (Frankel and Romer , 1999).
The size of a country is measured using both its area (A) and its population (P ). These
scale factors exhibit negative coefficients in Table 3.2. Note that the dependent variable in
Table 3.2 is the log transform of bilateral trade share (i.e. tij/GDPi) instead of bilateral trade
(i.e. tij), in which we would expect country size measures to exhibit positive coefficients.
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Bilateral trade share, which measures the trade openness for the home with respect to a
foreign country, is highly correlated with the relative border length with respect to country
area. Larger countries have a relatively shorter border length, and thus have a smaller
bilateral trade share with other countries. This is consistent with the fact that, all else equal,
larger countries tend to have more intra-national trade and less international trade (Frankel
and Romer , 1999). However, when the trading partner country j has a higher population,
then trade tends to increase (log(Pj) = 1.104
∗∗∗). This makes sense since trading partners
with larger populations typically have larger demands and/or supplies, which is likely to
lead to larger openness in country i. Landlocked countries tend to be less open to trade
(LL = −0.953∗∗∗). If two countries share a common border, then they are much more likely
to trade more (B = 5.766∗∗∗).
These results are broadly consistent with results presented in Frankel and Romer (1999)
and Kagohashi et al. (2015). For example, all studies find that being further apart and
landlocked decreases bilateral trade, while countries that share a common border see their
bilateral trade increase. Importantly, note that our bilateral trade share equation and table
does NOT include GDP. However, time varying GDP is used to predict the bilateral trade
share by Kagohashi et al. (2015) (refer to Eq 1 and Table 2 of Kagohashi et al. (2015)).
This is potentially problematic because GDP is likely to be endogenous to trade and water
withdrawals of a nation. So, our empirical specification improves upon the approach used
by Kagohashi et al. (2015), since we do not included time varying values of GDP, which may
be subject to endogeneity concerns.
3.4.2 Instrument quality
The quality of the instrument is very important in the IV methodology. To ensure a high
quality instrument, two assumptions must be satisfied: (1) the instrument must be highly
correlated with the instrumented variable and (2) the instrument must not be correlated
with other determinants of the outcome variable in the error term.
To test the first assumption, we evaluate the relationship between the instrument (con-
structed trade openness, T̂i) and the instrumented variable (actual trade openness). Fig-
ure 3.3 plots the relationship between the actual and constructed trade openness for each
country. This relationship appears to be roughly linear and increasing, which provides ev-
idence that the first assumption for a high quality instrument is satisfied. To quantify the
relationship between the actual and constructed trade share we use the Kleibergen-Paap
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statistic rk Wald F statistic (‘First stage F-statistic’ ). The first stage F statistic is greater
than the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 for weak instruments for all results (refer to Table 3.3),
which suggests that our instrument is not weak.
To check the second assumption, we evaluate the impact of geographic control variables on
our outcome variable of interest, water withdrawals. This is because the major assumption
for this IV approach is that the geographic attributes in the bilateral trade equation (Eq 3.3)
are uncorrelated with other determinants of water withdrawals besides control variables (i.e.
Xc in Eq 3.6 and 3.7). That is, the instrument will influence water withdrawals only through
trade, besides controlled channels, Xc.
We control for variables which are likely to be correlated with both trade openness (T )
and water withdrawals (W ). We control for national size by controlling for both area (A)
and population (P ). Additionally, we control for latitude (L) because global geographic
position may impact both T and W . This is because countries in lower latitudes tend to
be less involved in global trade and also have higher evaporative demands of crops. That is
to say, latitude likely effects water withdrawals through non-trade channels, and would thus
bias our results if we do not control for it. So, we control for log transform of area, log(A),
log transform of population, log(P ), and latitude, L.
However, it’s still unclear if there are other channels – such as climate, weather, and
geographic region – through which the constructed trade openness will impact water with-
drawals in agriculture. To check the robustness of our model, we systematically determine
the impact of various sets of control variables on our IV specification in Table 3.3. Note that
we control for region to eliminate the factors clustered by region such as culture, development
level, etc.
The structural composition between countries may impact their water use in agriculture
and industry. For example, wealthy nations might have larger industrial production and
trade more secondary and tertiary sectors (i.e. rather than agriculture). For this reason,
we control for agricultural fraction of GDP in Table 3.3 and industrial fraction of GDP
in Table 3.4. We control for both the agricultural and industrial fraction of GDP in Ta-
ble 3.5. Capital and labor are two of the main determinants of industrial production that
might influence both trade and water withdrawals, and thus need to be controlled for in our
industrial specification. Countries with more patents might participate in trade with more
technology-oriented products, and thus have larger exports and lower water withdrawals. For
this reason, we control for capital, labor, and total number of patents in Table 3.4. When we
add these sector specific controls to our specification the results are robust. These tests give
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us confidence that our preferred specification is measuring the impact of trade openness on
water withdrawals in a way that is robust to the varying structural composition of countries.
Table 3.3 suggests that the second stage coefficients are approximately the same across all
models. This is because the second stage coefficient is relatively stable around -5.00 and is
statistically significant at the 5% level across all specifications. From Table 3.3, we determine
that the model for agricultural water withdrawals is robust if we control for log(A), log(P ),
and L in our specification. Similarly, Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 suggest that our model for
industrial and total water withdrawals are robust. Our robustness checking results suggest
that although there might be some covariates correlated with trade and water withdrawals by
sectors, they are not correlated with our instrument (i.e. constructed trade openness), and
thus do not need to be controlled for in our model specification. We estimate the following
first and second stage equations accordingly:
Ti = b0 + b1T̂i + b2log(A) + b3log(P ) + b4L+ ui (3.8)
log(Wi) = c0 + c1T̃i + c2log(A) + c3log(P ) + c4L+ vi (3.9)
Thus, our preferred first and second stage specifications include land area (A), population
(P ), and latitude (L) as controls. Our preferred specification is shown in column (1) of
Table 3.3. We use this robust model for all analysis that follows.
3.4.3 Causal impact of trade openness on water withdrawals
Trade openness does not have a statistically significant causal impact on total water with-
drawals (i.e. water withdrawals in both agriculture and industry) (refer to Table 3.6). From
Table 3.6, trade openness illustrates a positive, but statistically insignificant, impact on
water withdrawals in industry (c1 = 1.09). The impact of trade openness on total water
withdrawals is negative, but also statistically insignificant (c1 =-1.08). However, the impact
of trade openness on water withdrawals in agriculture is negative and statistically significant
at the 5% level (c1 = −5.21∗∗).
Table 3.7 compares the OLS and IV estimates of the relationship between trade openness
and agricultural water withdrawals. OLS estimates reveal that there is a negative and statis-
tically significant relationship between trade openness and water withdrawals in agriculture
(c1 = −0.96∗; refer to column 1 of Table 3.7). However, simply looking at the correlation
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between trade openness and water withdrawals is uninformative about the causal relation-
ship between the variables. In column 1 of Table 3.7 water use is treated as the dependent
variable. But, countries may choose how much to trade based on their expected water use,
implying that causality also runs in the opposite direction. For scientific understanding and
policy purposes, we are most interested in the causal impact of trade on water use.
IV results, which enable us to identify the causal impact of trade openness on water use,
are provided in column 2 of Table 3.7. The coefficient of interest (c1 = −5.21∗∗; refer to
Section 3.3) is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. The results indicate that
one percentage point increase in trade openness leads to a 5.21% reduction in agricultural
water withdrawals. Significantly, this relationship has a causal interpretation. It is also
about five times larger than the corresponding OLS estimate, suggesting considerable bias
in the latter.
The goal of causal inference is to obtain an unbiased estimate of the coefficient of interest,
i.e. the coefficient on trade openness, c1. We are not directly concerned with the other
coefficients in the regression model. For this reason, we are most concerned that the coeffi-
cient on trade openness is robust across specification. We perform an extensive check of the
robustness in Tables 3.3 – 3.5 and find that the coefficient of interest is relatively constant.
This gives us confidence that we are accurately estimating the impact of trade openness on
water withdrawals (in agriculture, industry, and total).
Kagohashi et al. (2015) find that the overall effect of a 1% increase in trade openness
reduces total water withdrawals and/or consumption by roughly 1.0–1.5%, on average. Note
that Kagohashi et al. (2015) do not separate water withdrawals by economic sector (i.e.
agriculture, industry) as we do in this paper. So, we go one step further than Kagohashi
et al. (2015), by evaluating the impacts of trade openness on agricultural and industrial
withdrawals separately. This enables us to conclude that trade openness reduces agricultural
water withdrawals, but does not impact industrial water withdrawals.
3.4.4 Why does trade openness lead to less water withdrawals in agriculture?
The results in Table 3.6 suggest that the causal effect of trade openness on water with-
drawals in agriculture is different than in industry. So, there are unique characteristics of
agriculture that determine these mechanics. What are they? Why does trade openness lead
to less water withdrawals in agriculture? Here, we empirically determine the mechanism
driving changes in water use in agriculture. To do this, we follow Debaere and Kurzendoer-
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fer (2015), who highlight three mechanisms through which water use in an economy may be
impacted. Debaere and Kurzendoerfer (2015) decompose water use impacts by ‘scale’ of the
economy, ‘water productivity’ at the sectoral level, and ‘composition’ of the economy. We
follow this decomposition, but restricted to agriculture. In the agricultural setting, water
withdrawals may be impacted by ‘extensive margin’ effects, ‘intensive margin’ effects, or
‘crop mix’ effects.
First, trade openness may lead farmers to expand the area on which they grow crops,
which is defined as an extensive margin effect. To estimate the extensive margin effect,
we change the outcome variable in Eq 3.9. We use log transform of harvested area, log
transform of agricultural production, and log transform of the value of agricultural output.
Table 3.9 suggests that trade openness has no significant effect on the harvested area of
crops. Similarly, Table 3.9 suggests that trade openness does not significantly impact crop
production. Table 3.8 shows that trade openness does not impact the value of agricultural
output. We also evaluate the impact of trade openness on the value of industrial output
to compare potential extensive margin effects between agriculture and industry. For both
economic sectors, there is no impact of trade openness on the value of production. These
results in unison suggest that trade openness does not impact water withdrawals through
the extensive margin of production.
Second, trade openness might stimulate farmers to introduce more advanced technology,
and thus produce more per unit of water. This is defined as the intensive margin effect. We
use two measures of the intensive margin: crop yield and water withdrawal productivity. We
define water withdrawal productivity to be the value of production per water withdrawals.
Table 3.9 shows that trade openness does not impact the yield of crops in a statistically
significant way. Table 3.8 shows that trade openness does not impact total or industrial
water withdrawal productivity. However, a one percentage point increase in trade openness
leads to a 5.37% increase in agricultural water withdrawal productivity and is statistically
significant at the 5% level. Table 3.8 provides evidence that trade openness leads to less
water withdrawals in agriculture due to gains in water withdrawal productivity, an intensive
margin effect.
Finally, an increase in trade openness might cause farmers to change their crop mix in
a manner that uses less water. They might switch to produce higher-value but less water-
intensive crops for export, for example. We consider five major crops (rye, wheat, barley,
maize and oats) in this paper due to limitations in data availability for other crops. We
consider the causal effect on crop-specific log agricultural production, harvested area, and
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yield to examine the crop mix effect. Tables 3.9 suggests that trade openness does not lead
growers to switch between the major crop types, suggesting that crop switching amongst
major crops does not explain the reduction in water withdrawals in agriculture with increased
openness to trade.
So, these results contribute to our understanding as to why increased trade openness
leads to less water withdrawals in agriculture. The results presented in this section indicate
that trade openness leads to less water withdrawals in agriculture primarily through the
intensive margin. Our results confirm findings presented in Kagohashi et al. (2015) that
an expansion in trade openness encourages producers to adopt water-saving technologies.
In other words, it appears that openness to trade leads agricultural producers to generate
higher value agricultural production per unit water withdrawn. These results are consistent
with the explanation that trade openness leads farmers to adopt advanced technologies, such
as improved crop varieties and irrigation technology, that enable them to both generate more
agricultural revenue and use less water.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the debate over globalization and water resources. The major
question that this paper addressed is: What is the impact of trade openness on national
water use? Much work published on the water-trade nexus has focused on links between
trade and virtual water resources and has used these results to infer the implications of
trade for water use. We contribute to this literature by explicitly considering the impact
of trade for domestic, physical water use. Importantly, we use the instrumental variables
technique to evaluate the causal impact of trade openness for domestic agricultural and
industrial water withdrawals.
Our results suggest that a one percentage point increase in trade openness leads to a
5.21% decrease in agricultural water withdrawals. However, trade openness does not have a
significant impact on total or industrial water withdrawals. Why does trade openness lead to
less water withdrawals in agriculture? Our results suggest that trade openness reduces water
use in agriculture primarily through the intensive margin; for example, by leading farmers
to adopt technology, such as advanced irrigation technology. We do not find evidence for
extensive margin or crop mix impacts on agricultural water withdrawals. However, improved
water use data by source, crop, and industry would enable future research to refine our
analysis.
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Future work that incorporate trade directionality into the trade openness metric (i.e. as
in the directed gravity models in Tamea et al. (2014)) may yield new understanding. This is
because trade openness may have different impact for the country of import than it does for
the country of export. Additionally, probing heterogeneity in the trade-water relationship
of economic sectors is an important avenue for future research. Our IV approach assumes
that the treatment effects of trade openness are homogeneous across economic sectors (i.e.
identical regardless of what mechanism led to the change in trade openness). Future work
could explore the development of different instruments to evaluate if the treatment effects
are heterogeneous across sectors.
This paper shows that one unintended consequence of increased globalization is to use less
(physical) water to produce food. These results complement the recent literature that shows
that international trade saves (virtual) water resources. This work highlights the need for
future research to continue to refine our understanding of the trade-water nexus. In an era
of increasing anti-globalization sentiment, this work highlights one potential beneficial but
unintended consequence of trade: using less water to grow our food.
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Table 3.1: Sources of data used in this study.
Category Variable Variable Label Data source
trade tij bilateral trade between countries i and j IMF
Ti (export + import value for country i)/GDPi World Bank




latitude L latitude World Bank
dummy ECA Europe and Central Asia World Bank
variable LAC Latin America and Caribbean
for MENA Middle East and North Africa
region NA North America
SA South Asia
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
EAP East Asia and Pacific
population P population UNPD
weather apre Area-weighted annual average precipitation Dell et al. (2012)
atem Area-weighted annual average temperature
wpre Population-weighted annual average precipitation
wtem Population-weighted annual average temperature
climate kgatrstr % land area in Koeppen-Geiger tropics and subtropics PSU
zone kgatemp % land area in Koeppen-Geiger temperate zones
kgptrstr % 1995 pop in Koeppen-Geiger tropics and subtropics
kgptemp % 1995 pop in Koeppen-Geiger temperate zones
crop-specific agricultureal production FAOSTAT
variables agricultural harvested area
yield
water W water withdrawals AQUASTAT
industry- K net fixed standardized capital stock EPWT
related L number of employed workers EPWT
variables patent total count of patents in force by applicant origin WIPO
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Table 3.2: The bilateral equation showing the impact of geographic attributes on the log of
the bilateral trade share (τij). Notations of variables are the same as those in Eq 3.3.
Dependent variable:




































Residual Std. Error 2.642 (df = 19934)
F Statistic 952.381∗∗∗ (df = 13; 19934)















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.6: Causal effect of trade on log water withdrawals. Second stage results are
provided for log total water withdrawals, log agricultural water withdrawals, and log
industrial water withdrawals. The geographic controls are land area (A), population (P ),
and latitude (L).
Total Agricultural Industrial
openness -1.08 -5.21 ** 1.09
(1.16) (2.52) (1.18)
Fstat 11.3*** 11.3*** 11.3***
N obs 108 108 108
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.7: The effect of trade openness on agricultural water withdrawals, OLS versus
instrumental variables.
Log agricultural water withdrawals Real trade openness
OLS IV (Second Stage) IV (First stage)
Real trade openness -0.96* -5.21 **
(0.48) (2.52)
Constructed trade openness 1.03***
(0.31)
Observations 129 108 108
First stage F-statistic 11.3
1 Standard errors in parentheses.
2 *** denotes significance at the 1% level. ** denotes significance at the 5% level.
3 Dependent variable indicated at the top of the columns.
4 All regressions include log population, log area, and latitude as controls.
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Table 3.8: Causal effect of trade openness on the value of output [$] and log water
withdrawal productivity. Second stage results are provided for log total water withdrawals,
log agricultural water withdrawals, and log industrial water withdrawals. The geographic
controls are land area (A), population (P ), and latitude (L).
Total Agricultural Industrial
log(Value of output)
openness 1.21 0.15 1.37
(1.34) (0.61) (1.51)
log(Water withdrawal productivity)
openness 2.29 5.37 ** 0.28
(1.72) (2.6) (1.49)
Fstat 11.3*** 11.3*** 11.3***
N obs 108 108 108
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.9: Causal effect of trade openness on crop-specific log transform of agricultural
production, agricultural harvested area and yield. The geographic controls are land area
(A), population (P ), and latitude (L).
(1) Total Cereal (2) Rye (3) Wheat (4) Barley (5) Maize (6) Oats
log(Production)
[$] [tonnes] [tonnes] [tonnes] [tonnes] [tonnes]
openness 2.01 1.93 -2.02 -0.58 0.95 0.17
(1.23) (2.64) (2.36) (1.8) (1.63) (2.07)
log(Harvested Area)
[Ha] [Ha] [Ha] [Ha] [Ha] [Ha]
openness 1.82 1.2 -2.37 -0.75 0.38 -0.03
(1.32) (2.63) (2.38) (1.69) (1.69) (1.81)
log(Yield)
[$/Ha] [t/Ha] [t/Ha] [t/Ha] [t/Ha] [t/Ha]
openness 0.16 0.73 0.33 0.18 0.51 0.2
(0.5) (0.52) (0.6) (0.66) (0.57) (0.66)
Fstat 18.2*** 12.5*** 15.5*** 13.1*** 17.7*** 15.3***
N obs 153 57 105 88 136 68
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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−5.08 1.27
Figure 3.1: World map for log trade openness in year 2002
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−8.52 6.33














































































































































































































































Figure 3.3: Actual versus constructed trade share.
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Chapter 4
TRADE OPENNESS AND THE NUTRIENT USE OF NATIONS
4.1 Abstract
To contribute to the debate over globalization and the environment we ask the question:
What is the impact of trade on the nutrient use of nations? We address this question by
using econometric methods to quantify the causal relationship between the trade openness
and the nutrient use of nations. We find that trade openness have a very small, if any, impact
on nutrient use. This is in line with previous research that shows that trade openness does
not have a negative impact on the environment. In agriculture, previous work has shown
that trade openness leads to less water use, while our results suggest that the impact on
nutrient use, if any, is very small. Why would trade openness reduce nutrient applications
in agriculture much smaller than agricultural water use? We show that the elasticity of
substitution between nutrient use and capital is smaller than is the elasticity of substitution
between water and capital. This suggests that agricultural inputs such as capital and labor
are easier to substitute for water than they are for nutrient use. This helps to explain why
the impact of trade on nutrient use is much smaller. Our findings have both scientific and
policy relevance as we strive to untangle causal relationships in the global food supply chain
and determine its environmental impacts.
4.2 Introduction
There has been much interest in the implications of trade for the environment. An ex-
tensive literature has developed on the resources embodied in traded goods. Significant
quantities of water (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012), nutrients (MacDonald et al., 2012),
energy (Vora et al., 2017), and land (Kastner et al., 2014) are embodied in internationally
traded goods. However, quantifying the resources embodied in traded goods does not help us
to understand if more or less resources would have been used in the absence of trade. Here,
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we consider the case of nutrient fertilizers. Nutrient use is an important channel through
which agriculture leads to deteriorations in water quality (Liu et al., 2010; Mekonnen and
Hoekstra, 2015, 2018). There is a critical need to better understand drivers of nutrient use
in the global agricultural system, including the role of trade in the nutrient use of nations.
Nations may change their agricultural production practices in order to participate in the
international trade system. As such, trade may impact the quantity of nutrient fertilizers –
a key agricultural input – used to grow our food.
The goal of this paper is to understand the impact of trade on national nutrient use. To do
this, we require a measure of trade for each nation. ‘Trade openness’ indicates the relative
intensity of trade to a national economy and is measured as total imports and exports as a
fraction of economic activity. To understand the relationship between trade openness and
nutrient use we could perform a regression between these two variables. However, a cross-
sectional regression of nutrient use on trade openness may not reflect the causal impact of
trade openness. There are two main problems with inferring causality from a cross-sectional
regression. First, reverse causality may exist. Access to nutrient fertilizers may enable
countries to produce and trade more agricultural products. Second, endogeneity distorts our
interpretation of regression results.
Problems with endogeneity arise when a confounder variable impacts both the independent
(trade openness) and dependent (nutrient use) variables. For example, wealthy countries are
more likely to be more open to trade and to have access to precision farming technologies,
potentially enabling them to use nutrient fertilizers more efficiently. In this case, a cross-
sectional regression would underestimate the impact of trade on nutrient use. Conversely,
if these wealthy countries implement policies that boost their agricultural production, that
would likely lead them to use more nutrient fertilizers and to trade more. In this case,
the correlational relationship between trade and nutrient use would be overestimated. Un-
fortunately, using information on the trade policies of nations is not guaranteed to solve
endogeneity concerns. This is because countries that adopt free trade policies may do so
precisely because they have the production capabilities required to meet the increased de-
mands that will come with trade liberalization.
We use the instrumental variables (IV) methodology to understand the causal impact
of trade openness on national nutrient. Frankel and Romer (1999) introduced the use of
the geographical determinants of trade to ‘instrument’ for trade and establish the causal
impact of trade on economic growth. Geographic factors determine trade, as given by the
gravity model of trade (Tinbergen, 1962), but are likely exogenous to outcome variables of
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interest (Frankel and Romer , 1999). This makes geographic variables a suitable instrument
for trade openness. Irvin and Tervi (2002) employ the same IV approach for a larger sample
of years to establish the impact of trade on income, corroborating earlier findings of Frankel
and Romer (1999). Previous research that uses this IV methodology suggests that trade
does not have a negative impact on the environment. Work by Frankel and Rose (2005)
found that trade reduces air pollution. Specifically, trade reduces SO2 and NO2 emissions,
but does not significantly impact particulate matter or emission of CO2 (Frankel and Rose,
2005). Similarly, recent research uses the geographical determinants of trade to show that
trade leads to less water use (Kagohashi et al., 2015), particularly in agriculture (Dang and
Konar , 2016).
In this paper, we contribute to the debate over globalization and the environment by
asking: What is the impact of trade on the nutrient use of nations? Importantly, we use
an IV methodology to determine the causal impact of trade openness on national nutrient
use. Our IV methodology follows the approach first employed in the seminal work of Frankel
and Romer (1999), in which geographic variation is used to instrument for trade, based on
the gravity model of trade. We detail our data and methods in Section 4.3. Our results are
presented in Section 4.4. We conclude in Section 4.5.
4.3 Methods
Here, we describe our methods. In Section 4.3.1, we detail the national data we use
on trade, geographic attributes, agricultural production, and nutrient use. We also detail
data on input price, nutrient use, and water use within the United States that we use to
estimate the elasticity of substitution between water and nutrient inputs. Table 4.1 lists all
data sources used in this study. In Section 4.3.2 we explain the instrumental variables (IV)
technique for causal inference. In Section 4.3.3, we explain how we quantify the elasticity of
substitution between water and nutrients.
4.3.1 Data
International data
To determine the impact of trade openness on nutrients use, we require information on
bilateral trade, trade openness, geography, and nutrient use. We detail all data sources used
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to collect these variables in this Section and in Table 4.1. All data is collected at the national
scale.
• Bilateral trade data are collected from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Di-
rection of Trade Statistics (DOTS) (International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade
Statistics (DOTS), 2015). DOTS provides bilateral trade in value [$]. Annual data are
available from 1947 to 1960, with monthly and quarterly data availability beginning in
1960.
• Trade openness of a nation is defined to be total trade as a fraction of total economic
activity. Total economic activity is typically estimated using gross domestic product
(GDP). So, the trade openness of each nation is: Tc =
Ic+Ec
GDPc
. T refers to trade openness,
I refers to gross imports of goods and services in value, E refers to gross exports of
goods and services in value, ‘GDP’ is gross domestic product, and c indicates country.
We obtain data on total import value, total export value, and GDP (all in [$]) for each
nation from the World Bank data portal (World Bank , 2015). Our trade openness
variable is mapped in Figure 4.2A.
• We collect many geographic variables. We collect information on national area, land-
locked dummy variable, border dummy variable, and the distance between pairs of
countries from the GeoDist database (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). We collect lati-
tude, region, and agricultural GDP from the World Bank data portal (World Bank ,
2015). We collect total population (thousands) from United Nations Population Di-
vision (UNPD , 2015). Our weather estimates are taken from Dell et al. (2012). Dell
et al. (2012) aggregate high resolution monthly historical weather data to the coun-
try year level. Their weather data is taken from the Terrestrial Air Temperature and
Precipitation: 1900-2006 Gridded Monthly Time Series, Version 1.01 (Matsuura and
Willmott , 2007). This weather data is aggregated to the country-year level using either
population or area as weights. We obtain climate data from Portland State University
(2015). Portland State University (2015) take the Koeppen-Geiger climate zones map
from Strahler and Strahler (1992) and calculate the percent land area and population
in each climate zone at the country-year level.
• Data on the nutrient use of nations are collected from the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization of the United Nations Statistics Division (FAOSTAT) (FAOSTAT , 2018).
Specifically, we collect data on the total nitrogen (N), phosphate (P2O5), and potash
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(K2O) from all fertilizer products. Potash is any of various mined and manufactured
salts that contain potassium in water-soluble form. Inorganic phosphates are mined to
obtain phosphorus for use in agriculture and industry. National nutrient use data is
provided in total nutrient use in agriculture [tonnes] and average use per area of crop-
land [kg/ha]. We collect this data at the county-year level from 2002-2014. Nutrient
use for the year 2006 is mapped in Figure 4.2B-D.
United States data
The information that we require to estimate the elasticity of substitution between nutri-
ents, water, and capital are not available at the national level. For this reason, we turn the
data available from government databases within the United States. We collect county level
cross-sectional input and output data for agricultural production for the US. In particular,
we collect data on total agricultural expenses, chemical expenses, and fertilizer expenses
from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) (USDA, 2018). We select year
2012 as it is the most recent year with data available. We also collect water withdrawals in
irrigation for year 2010 from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) (USGS , 2018).
We choose year 2010 since it is the year closest to 2012 with available data. Total crop sales
for year 2012 are collected from the USDA (USDA, 2018). We explain the method that we
use to estimate the elasticity of substitution for water and nutrients in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.2 Instrumental variables method
The goal of this paper is to understand the relationship between trade openness and
nutrient use. To isolate the causal impact of trade openness on nutrient use, we use an ‘in-
strumental variables’ (IV) or ‘two-stage least squares’ approach (Angrist and Pischke, 2009;
Wooldridge, 2010). For this methodology, we must identify a variable that is (1) strongly
correlated with trade openness and (2) uncorrelated with any unobservable determinants of
nutrient use. Such a variable is known as an ‘instrument’. In the ‘first stage’ of an instrumen-
tal variables estimation, the variation in the endogenous variable that is driven by another
variable that is only related to nutrient use through the endogenous variable is isolated. In
the ‘second stage’, the predicted value of the endogenous variable from the first stage is used
as the independent variable to obtain a causal estimate.
The IV procedure is provided in Equation 4.1 and 4.2. The first stage is provided in
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Equation 4.1. In Equation 4.1, the endogenous variable, i.e. the real trade openness (T),
is regressed on the constructed trade openness variable (T̂ ) and control variables, Xc. The
second stage is provided in Equation 4.2. In Equation 4.2, log nutrient use (U) is regressed
on predicted values of real trade openness, denoted as T̃ , and controls, Xc.
Ti = b0 + b1T̂i + b
T
2 Xc + ui (4.1)
log(Ui) = c0 + c1T̃i + c
T
2 Xc + vi (4.2)
To estimate the standard errors we follow the approach of Dang and Konar (2016), as
originally suggested by Frankel and Romer (1999).
We follow Frankel and Romer (1999) to construct an instrument for trade openness based
upon the geographic attributes of a country. Frankel and Romer (1999) used the geographic
factors of a country, such as area, population, and distance to neighbors, to develop an
instrument for trade openness. Geographic factors are a suitable choice for an instrument
of trade openness, since they determine trade, but are exogenous to outcome variables of
interest (Frankel and Romer , 1999). For this reason, geographic variation has been used as
part of an IV methodology to determine the impact of trade on several outcome variables of
interest, including economic growth (Frankel and Romer , 1999), air pollution (Frankel and
Rose, 2005), environmental policy (Andonova et al., 2007), and water use (Dang and Konar ,
2016).
First, we estimate the log transform of the bilateral trade share (τij ≡ log tijGDPi ) using
geographic factors. The bilateral trade share is defined to be the bilateral trade between
country i and j (tij) as a fraction of GDP in country i. For predictors, we follow those intro-
duced by Frankel and Romer (1999), which stems from the gravity model of international
trade, but only uses geographic attributes as predictors (i.e. GDP is omitted as a predictor
variable because of potential endogeneity concerns). To specify, the log transform of the




= a0 + a1log(Dij) + a2log(Pi) + a3log(Ai) + a4log(Pj) + a5log(Aj)
+ a6(LLi + LLj) + a7Bij + a8Bijlog(Dij) + a9Bijlog(Pi) + a10Bijlog(Ai)
+ a11Bijlog(Pj) + a12Bijlog(Aj) + a13Bij(LLi + LLj) + eij
(4.3)
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where tij is the bilateral trade in value (the sum of import value and export value) between
country i and country j. D is distance, P is population, A is land area, LL is a landlocked
dummy, which indicates whether the country is landlocked or not, and B is a border dummy,
which indicates whether the two countries share a common border or not. The interaction
terms between the border dummy and all of the other explanatory variables are included in
this model.
In this way, τij refer to element i, j in a matrix of all estimated bilateral trade shares.
Based on Eq 4.3, we get the estimated bilateral trade share (τ̂ij) for all pairs of i and j
(i 6= j), which forms matrix τ̂ . Note that the matrix τ̂ is not symmetric (i.e. τij 6= τji).
τij ≡ log tijGDPi , while τji ≡ log
tji
GDPj
. The numerators are the same (i.e. tij = tji) because
they are the total bilateral trade flow between country i and j. Yet the denominators are
GDPs for country i and j respectively, which are different.
Second, as in Frankel and Romer (1999), the instrument for trade openness for country






where T̂i is the constructed trade openness. Note that T̂i is the instrument in our model.

























is the vector of the estimated coefficients in Eq 4.3. Xij is the vector of all
the independent variables between country i and country j included in Equation 4.3. We
assume that eij is homoscedastic, such that E(exp(eij)|Xij) is a constant. In this case, the
instrument equals
∑
j 6=i exp(τ̂ij) times a constant. We ignore this constant term since it does
not impact the the IV methodology.
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4.3.3 Elasticity of substitution
The elasticity of substitution indicates how easy it is to substitute between two inputs in an
industry. A high value for the elasticity of substitution implies that small changes in relative
input prices leads to a large shift in input use. In contrast, a small value of the elasticity of
substitution implies that changing the relative input prices does not impact input use much.
In the limit, where the elasticity of substitution is equal to zero, there is no response to a
change in relative input price; this is the case where there is no substitute for the necessary
input. Here, we describe how we estimate the elasticity of substitution between three key
agricultural inputs: nutrients, water and ‘others’. ‘Others’ includes capital, labor, and all
other agricultural inputs except nutrients and water. Unlike classical economic models, we
do not consider the substitution between capital and labor. We regard capital and labor as
a whole to focus on their substitution with nutrients or water.
CES function
The elasticity of substitution is the percentage change of the ratio of two inputs with
respect to the percentage change of the ratio of their marginal products. In a competitive
market, the percentage change in the ratio of two inputs changes in response to a percentage
change in their prices, given by:
σ ≡ − dln (x1/x2)
dln (F1/F2)
= − dln (a1/a2)
dln (w1/w2)
(4.6)
Where x1 and x2 are the quantities of two inputs; F1 and F2 are the partial derivative of







); a1 and a2 are the quantities of two inputs to produce one unit of output; and
w1 and w2 are the input prices.
A production function describes how the output quantity varies as a function of input
quantity. The two most widely used forms for production functions are the Cobb-Douglas
and Leontief. These production functions make strong assumptions about the underlying
elasticity of substitution. The Cobb-Douglas production function assumes the elasticity of
substitution to be 1; while the Leontief production function assumes that the elasticity of
substitution is 0. The specifications for the two production functions are:












where y is the output quantity, and x1 and x2 are the two input quantities.
Arrow et al. (1961) developed the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production
function in order to relax the strong assumption about the elasticity of substitution. The
CES function is a more general production function which assumes that the elasticity of
substitution is any non-negative constant. The CES production function with two inputs is:




where y is the output quantity, x1 and x2 are the two input quantities, and γ, δ, and ρ are
parameters. Note that this specification assumes no return to scales (i.e. if we double the two
inputs at the same time, the output will be doubled). The constant elasticity of substitution
is σ = 1/(1 + ρ). If ρ → 0, then σ → 1 and the function approaches the Cobb-Douglas
equation; if ρ→∞, then σ → 0 and the function approaches the Leontief equation.
To consider the case when there are more than two inputs, Sato (1967) developed the
two-level nested CES function. The specification for the three-input nested CES function is:
y = γ[δ(δ1x
−ρ1
1 + (1− δ1)x
−ρ1
2 )
ρ/ρ1 + (1− δ)x−ρ3 ]−1/ρ (4.10)
Note that this specification assumes that the elasticity of substitution between input 1
and input 3 is the same as that between input 2 and input 3. Note that the specification
is not symmetric, which suggests that the order of the three inputs matters. As such, it is
necessary to consider different structures of the specification by using different orderings of
the three inputs.
Levenberg-Marquardt (LM) algorithm to estimate parameters
We need to estimate the parameters in Equation 4.10. The production function provided
in Equation 4.10 is non-linear in its parameters. As such, advanced non-linear estimation
methods are required to estimate the parameters. Most algorithms for the least-squares
estimation of nonlinear parameters are based on the Gauss-Newton method or the gradient
descend method. The LM algorithm is a maximum neighborhood method which performs
an optimum interpolation between the Gauss-Newton method and the gradient descend
method (Marquardt , 1963). We use the R package micEconCES (Henningsen and G , 2011)
to obtain the LM algorithm estimator of the parameters.
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4.4 Results and discussion
Here, we present and discuss results on the relationship between trade openness and the
nutrient use of nations. First, we determine the quality of our instrument. Then, we compare
the correlational (OLS) and causal (IV) estimates of the relationship between trade openness
and nutrient use. Finally, we examine a few potential reasons for the observed relationships
between trade openness and nutrient use.
4.4.1 Instrument quality
Our instrument (1) must be highly correlated with actual trade openness (i.e. the instru-
mented variable) and (2) must not be correlated with other drivers of nutrient use in the
error term. To check the first condition, we evaluate the relationship between the instrument
(constructed trade openness, T̂i) and the instrumented variable (actual trade openness). We
plot the relationship between actual and constructed trade openness for each country and
nutrient in Figure 4.1. This relationship is roughly linear and increasing, providing evidence
that the first assumption for a high quality instrument is satisfied. We use the Kleibergen-
Paap statistic rk Wald F statistic (‘First stage F-statistic’ ) to quantify the relationship
between the actual and constructed trade share. The first stage F statistic is always greater
than 10, which is the rule-of-thumb value for strong instruments (refer to Tables 4.2- 4.4).
These results indicate that our instrument is not weak.
To check the second condition, we evaluate the impact of geographic controls on our
outcome variable(s) of interest (i.e. nitrogen, phosphate, and potassium use in agriculture).
We do this to ensure that geographic variables are uncorrelated with nutrient use except
through trade. In Tables 4.2- 4.4 we systematically evaluate the impact of various geographic
variables on nutrient use for the year 2006. From Tables 4.2- 4.4, we determine that the model
for N, P, and K are robust if we control for log(A), log(P ), and L in our specification. These
robustness tables suggest that although there might be some covariates correlated with trade
and nutrient use by sectors, they are not correlated with our instrument, and thus do not
need to be controlled for in our model specification.
Accordingly, our preferred first and second stage specifications are give by:
Ti = b0 + b1T̂i + b2log(A) + b3log(P ) + b4L+ ui (4.11)
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log(Ui) = c0 + c1T̃i + c2log(A) + c3log(P ) + c4L+ vi (4.12)
where all variables follow those in Equations 4.1 and 4.2. Note that our IV specification
includes land area (A), population (P ), and latitude (L) as controls. This selected specifi-
cation is shown in column (1) of Tables 4.2- 4.4. This robust model is used in all analysis
that follows.
4.4.2 Estimated impact of trade openness on nutrient use
Visually, it is not clear how trade openness and the national use of nutrients are correlated
(i.e. compare Figure 4.2A with Figure 4.2B-D). To examine the relationship between T and U
we first turn to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. OLS estimates the partial correlation
between the two variables of interest; in this case, nutrient use and trade openness. The OLS
equation is given by:
Uc = βTc + γ
TXc + υ. (4.13)
where U is nutrient use, T is trade openness, X is a set of control variables (i.e. land
area (A), population (P), and latitude (L)), c is a country index, and υ is the error term,
assumed to be independent, identical, and normally distributed. The coefficient of interest
is β, which is a scalar and indicates the relationship between trade openness and nutrient
use. γ is a vector and represents the coefficients corresponding to the set of control variables
for country c.
OLS results are presented in row A of Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7. These regression results are
not robust across years and are typically not statistically significant. However, when they
are statistically significant, the coefficients are positive. This indicates that trade openness
would lead nations to use more nutrients. In other words, according to OLS estimates,
trade openness either has no impact or increases the nutrient use of nations. However, the
correlation between two variables is insufficient for understanding their causal relationship.
Our IV results suggest that the impact of trade openness on the nutrient use of nations is
very small and insignificant. To see this, note that the coefficients in row B of Tables 4.5, 4.6,
and 4.7 do not have stars to denote statistical significance at any level. Tables with expanded
results for all specifications are provided in the Supplementary Information (SI) document.
We also estimate the coefficients using the panel dataset with yearly fixed effect. The
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results are presented in Table 4.11. The IV estimator with panel dataset suggests that
one percentage point increase in trade openness leads to a 0.58% reduction in nitrogen and
phosphate use. The effects are significant at 5% significant level and 10% significant level
respectively. However, the effect on potash use is small and not significant. By using a
panel dataset, we can apply the IV method on a much larger dataset with about 1800
observations, and thus the result has a larger power. Therefore, the results suggest very
small and significant effects.
Thus, the IV methodology, which more closely estimates the causal impact of trade on
an outcome of interest, indicates that trade openness has a small and negative impact on
nutrient use. So, the OLS estimate is biased upward in many instances. This means that
a confounding variable is distorting our understanding of the impact of trade openness on
nutrient use when OLS is performed. This could be because policies in wealthy nations boost
agricultural production and lead to both more trade and more nutrient use. Thus, the OLS
correlation is biased and distorts the true impact of trade openness on nutrient use.
4.4.3 Why is the impact of trade openness on nutrient use very small?
Previous research has found that trade openness leads to less water use in agriculture (Dang
and Konar , 2016). However, here we find that trade openness leads to slightly less nitrogen
and phosphate use and does not have a significant impact on potash. Differences also exist
for water use and nutrient use in a different setting. Deryugina and Konar (2017b) found
that a 1% increase in crop insurance leads to a 0.223% increase in water use, while Weber
et al. (2015) found that crop insurance did not have a significant impact on fertilizer and
chemical use. Why are the impacts different between water and nutrient use?
Dang and Konar (2016) highlight three mechanisms through which water use may be
impacted by trade openness: ‘extensive margin’ effects, ‘intensive margin’ effects, or ‘crop
mix’ effects. Dang and Konar (2016) find that trade openness reduces water use in agriculture
primarily through the intensive margin effect, by leading farmers to produce more with less
water; they do not find evidence for extensive margin or crop mix impacts. Following this
approach, we try to estimate the intensive margin effect of trade openness on nutrient use.
To specify, we use the nitrogen, phosphate, potash use per cropland area as the dependent
variable in Equation 4.12. Tables 4.8 through 4.10 show that trade openness does not impact
the per cropland area use of nutrients significantly. So, we do not find evidence that trade
impacts nutrient use through the intensive margin.
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We also estimate the intensive margin using the panel dataset with yearly fixed effect.
The results are presented in Table 4.11. The result suggests that trade openness does not
impact nutrient use through the intensive margin.
Why are the impacts on intensive margin different between water and nutrient use? One
potential explanation is that capital and labor are easier to substitute for water than for
chemical use. Previous research shows that other inputs in agriculture, such as labor and
capital, is substitutable for water (Cai et al., 2008; Edwards et al., 1996). For example, sci-
entific irrigation scheduling or managed deficit irrigation are effective in saving water (Evans
and Sadler , 2008). These approaches require more labor and capital to save water. When
an economy becomes more open, it brings in new water-saving technologies which makes
the capital relatively cheap, and thus drives capital to substitute for water. For example,
the development of low-cost aluminum and later PVC pipe enhanced sprinkler technology
in agriculture (Evans and Sadler , 2008). However, technologies that save nutrients are not
as readily abundant. Like water, scientific scheduling can save nutrients. However, prede-
termined nutrient management plans may make the use of nutrients inelastic.
To explore differences between nutrient and water use, we estimate the elasticity of substi-
tution between water, chemical, and other inputs. As explained in Section 4.3.3, we assume
that the production function follows the nested CES specification (i.e. Equation 4.10). x1,
x2 and x3 are the three inputs. We consider two structures for the three inputs: (1) x1, x2
and x3 are water, others, and chemical use, respectively (denoted as (water, others)-chemical
structure); (2) x1, x2 and x3 are chemical use, others, and water use, respectively (denoted
as (chemical, other)-water structure).
Table 4.12 provides the estimates for the parameters in the production function. The R2
is 0.931 and 0.936 for the two structures, respectively, which suggests that the specifications
for the production function fit well with the data. Table 4.13 show that the elasticity of
substitution between water and capital (=1(0.06)***) is greater than that between chemical
use and capital (=0.26(0.02)***). This suggests that agricultural inputs such as capital and
labor are easier to substitute for water than they are for chemical inputs. This result helps to
explain why trade openness leads to a small and insignificant effect on the use of nutrients,
yet a significant effect for water use.
Unfortunately, this CES approach is not able to capture the differences of weather and
soil condition in different area. Precipitation and soil condition will effect the resource
endowments of water and nutrients respectively. Temperature will effect the productivity
of water. The CES approach measures the substitution elasticity in the whole agriculture
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sector and ignore the differences of resource endowments and productivity.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the debate over globalization and the environment. The major
question that this paper addressed is: What is the impact of trade openness on national
nutrient use? Our results suggest that trade openness does not have a negative impact on
the nutrient use of nations. This is in line with previous research that shows that trade
openness does not have a negative impact on the environment. We show that the elasticity
of substitution between nutrient use and capital is smaller than it is for water and capital.
This suggests that agricultural inputs such as capital and labor are easier to substitute for
water than they are for nutrient use. This helps to explain why trade openness would reduce
water use, as has been previously shown in the literature (Dang and Konar , 2016), but would
alter the nutrient use of nations very slightly.
The results provide evidence in support of free trade policies. Free trade policies are
likely to increase trade openness of nations. Increase in trade openness does not significantly
increase nutrient use at least. Actually, our results suggest that increase in trade openness
leads to a slightly reduction in nutrient use, and thus good to the environment. This provide
a way to save nutrient use through trade without directly targeting nutrient use.
This work empirically determines that trade does not have negative unintended conse-
quences for the quantity of nutrients that we use to produce our food. Recent work has
presented a theoretical model of water and trade (Dang et al., 2016) that is consistent with
empirical findings on the relationship between trade and water use (Kagohashi et al., 2015;
Dang and Konar , 2016). Now, we suggest there is a need for a similar model to be developed
to explain the mechanistic relationship between trade and nutrient use. We suggest that fu-
ture modeling efforts could aim to be consistent with the empirical findings presented in this
paper. Such a model might incorporate the unique attributes of the elasticity of substitution
between nutrients and other agricultural inputs that we characterized. More broadly, this
work contributes to a body of literature that generally finds that trade does not negatively
impact the environment, making it of interest to the science and policy communities.
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4.6 Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Sources of data used in this study.
Category Variable Variable Label Data source
A: Country level data
trade tij bilateral trade between countries i and j IMF
Ti (export + import value for country i)/GDPi World Bank




latitude L latitude World Bank
dummy ECA Europe and Central Asia World Bank
variable LAC Latin America and Caribbean
for MENA Middle East and North Africa
region NA North America
SA South Asia
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
EAP East Asia and Pacific
production agricultural percentage of GDP World Bank
population P population UNPD
weather apre Area-weighted annual average precipitation Dell et al. (2012)
atem Area-weighted annual average temperature
wpre Population-weighted annual average precipitation
wtem Population-weighted annual average temperature
climate kgatrstr % land area in Koeppen-Geiger tropics and subtropics PSU
zone kgatemp % land area in Koeppen-Geiger temperate zones
kgptrstr % 1995 pop in Koeppen-Geiger tropics and subtropics
kgptemp % 1995 pop in Koeppen-Geiger temperate zones
nutrients N, P, K Nitrogen, phosphate, potash use in agriculture [tonnes] FAOSTAT
Average N, P, K use per area of cropland [kg/ha]
B: County level data in the US
expense Total, chemical use, fertilizer expense [$] USDA
output Total crop sales USDA






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.11: Causal effect of trade openness on nitrogen (N),phosphate (P) and potash (K)
and their use per cropland. Panel dataset for year 2002-2014 is applied. The geographic
controls are land area (A), population (P ), and latitude (L). Yearly fixed effect is
controlled.
log(N) log(P) log(K) log(N per cropland) log(P per cropland) log(K per cropland)
A: IV (second stage)
openness -0.58** -0.58* -0.38 0.04 0.43 0.42
(0.27) (0.32) (0.39) (0.29) (0.30) (0.40)
B: IV (first stage)
openness 1.10*** 1.13*** 1.06*** 1.03*** 1.12*** 1.04***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Fstat 227.0*** 241.4*** 256.7 *** 274.8*** 234.9*** 282.2***
N obs 1865 1824 1800 1824 1804 1778
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.12: Estimation by non-linear least-squares using the ‘LM’ optimizer.
(water, others)-chemical (chemical, others)-water
γ 5.00 (1.25) *** 3.35 (0.63) ***
δ1 0.07 ( 0.06) 0.03 (0.02) *
δ 0.44 (0.21) ** 0.97 (0.02) ***
ρ1 0.00 (0.06) 2.92 (0.38 ) ***
ρ 1.49 (0.17) *** 0.01 (0.04)
N obs 2639 2639
R2 0.931 0.936
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.13: CES estimate results
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(water, others) 1.00 0.06 17.81 0.00 ***
(water, others)-chemical 0.40 0.03 14.46 0.00 ***
(chemical, others) 0.26 0.02 10.32 0.00 ***
(chemical, others)-water 0.99 0.04 22.69 0.00 ***
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 4.1: Actual versus constructed trade share for countries that use nitrogen (A),
phosphate (B), and potash (C). Note that graphs are identical across nutrients, unless a
nation is not in a specific cross section because they do not use a particular nutrient or the
data is missing. For example, the outlier Singapore (SGP) is not presented in Panel (C),
since Singapore does not use potash.
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Figure 4.2: World maps for trade openness and nutrient use in 2006. National level trade
openness (A), nitrogen use (B), phosphate use (C), and potash use (D) are shown. Note











Figure 4.3: Maps of variables within the United States. County level (A) chemical and
fertilizer expenses, (B) other expenses, (C) water withdrawals, and (D) agricultural output
are shown. Note that the log of each variable is provided. All variables are for the year





In this dissertation, I presented a model that captures the mechanistic relationships be-
tween water as a domestic factor of production, as well as the consumption and trade of
water-intensive commodities. I also contribute to the debate over trade and environment by
quantifying the causal impact of trade on water withdrawals and nutrient use.
I show the conditions under which agricultural trade liberalization influences water use,
depending on the elasticity of substitution of water. An important result is that a target
tax – which offsets the increase in water consumption due to trade liberalization – can be
proportionately smaller than the increase in agricultural output price. Subsidizing capital
in the agricultural sector may lead to the adoption of advanced technologies, such as drip
irrigation and water saving seed and fertilizer technologies, which increases water-use effi-
ciency and reduces water consumption in agriculture. I also show that inclusion of stochastic
water supplies into the model induces producers to reduce their demand for water, which is
an unclear relationship ex-ante. This highlights the fact that policies that are not directly
focused on water resources may have a significant impact on water use. This may be helpful
in situations in which direct water policies are politically unpalatable.
I also show that a one percentage point increase in trade openness leads to a 5.21%
decrease in agricultural water withdrawals. If we consider the median of agricultural water
withdrawals for all the countries in year 2002, one percentage point increase in trade openness
leads to 47.9 million cubic meters reduction in agricultural water withdrawals. However,
trade openness does not have a significant impact on total or industrial water withdrawals.
Why does trade openness lead to less water withdrawals in agriculture? Results suggest that
trade openness reduces water use in agriculture primarily through the intensive margin; for
example, by leading farmers to adopt technology, such as advanced irrigation technology.
We do not find evidence for extensive margin or crop mix impacts on agricultural water
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withdrawals. However, improved water use data by source, crop, and industry would enable
future research to refine our analysis.
For water quality, results suggest that trade openness has a very small, if any, impact on
the nutrient use of nations, and thus has a very small, if any, effect on water quality. To
specify, one percentage point increase in trade openness leads to a 0.58% significant decrease
in nitrogen (N) and phosphate (P) use, and a 0.38% but not significant decrease on potash
(K) use. If we consider the median of N, P, K use for all the countries in year 2014, one
percentage point increase can save 3937, 1728 and 912 tonnes of N, P, K per year respectively.
This is in line with previous research that shows that trade openness does not have a negative
impact on the environment. I show that the elasticity of substitution between nutrient use
and capital is smaller than it is for water and capital. This suggests that agricultural inputs
such as capital and labor are easier to substitute for water than they are for nutrient use.
This helps to explain why the impact of trade openness on nutrient use of nations is much
smaller than the impact on water use, as has been previously shown in Chapter 3.
Comparing with the effects of trade openness on other factors helps us to understand
the magnitude of the effects. Frankel and Romer (1999) find that a one-percentage-point
increase in the trade share raises income per person by 2.0 percent. Frankel and Rose (2005)
show that the effects are -0.33% on sulfur dioxide (SO2), -0.23% on nitrogen dioxide (NO2)
-0.31% on total suspended particulate matter (PM), and the effects on SO2 and NO2 are
significant, while on PM is not. Comparing with our finding, the effect on agricultural water
withdrawals, which is 5.21%, is 2.6 times the effect on income per person, which is very
large. The effects on nutrient use, which are -0.58, -0.58 and -0.38 on nitrogen, phosphate
and potash respectively, are very close to the effects on air pollution.
This dissertation provides evidence in support of free trade policies. Free trade policies are
likely to increase trade openness of nations. Increase in trade openness does not significantly
increase agricultural water use and nutrient use at least. Actually, our results suggest that
increase in trade openness leads to a reduction in agricultural water use and slightly reduction
in nitrogen and phosphate use, and thus good to the environment. This provide a way to
save water and nutrient use through trade without directly targeting resource use.
5.2 Future Research Extensions
The theoretical model present in this dissertation enables mechanisms between trade and
water resources to be displayed in a simple and coherent framework. Future extensions to
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the model may consider the implications of infrastructure and distinct sources of water, such
as rainfall, surface irrigation supplies, and groundwater supplies. The integration of theory
with empirical analyses represents a particularly important direction for future research.
Also, I suggest there is a need for a similar model to be developed to explain the mechanistic
relationship between trade and nutrient use. I suggest that future modeling efforts could
aim to be consistent with the empirical findings presented in this dissertation. Such a model
might incorporate the unique attributes of the elasticity of substitution between nutrients
and other agricultural inputs that we characterized.
For quantification analysis, future work that incorporate trade directionality into the trade
openness metric (i.e. as in the directed gravity models in Tamea et al. (2014)) may yield new
understanding. This is because trade openness may have different impact for the country
of import than it does for the country of export. Additionally, probing heterogeneity in the
trade-water relationship of economic sectors is an important avenue for future research. Our
IV approach assumes that the treatment effects of trade openness are homogeneous across
economic sectors (i.e. identical regardless of what mechanism led to the change in trade
openness). Future work could explore the development of different instruments to evaluate
if the treatment effects are heterogeneous across sectors.
Also, I suggest future work to consider the impact of additional policies, such as tax and
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